1 STATE OF ILLINOIS SS. 2 COUNTY OF DU PAGE 3 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DU PAGE COUNTY FOR THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS 4 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 5 WINFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT 34, 6 Plaintiff, 7 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 94, 8 9 Plaintiff-Intervenor 10 NO. 21 CH 454 VS. (emergency 11 VILLAGE OF WINFIELD, motion) 12 Defendant. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS had 13 14 taken at the hearing of the above-entitled cause, 15 before the HONORABLE BRYAN S. CHAPMAN, Judge of 16 said Court, recorded on the DuPage County 17 computer-based digital recording system, DuPage County, Illinois, transcribed by Lisa Marie 18 19 Novak, commencing on the 21st day of March A.D. 20 2024. 21 22 23 LISA MARIE NOVAK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 24 CERT. # 084-004296

1	PRESENT:
2	HODGES, LOIZZI, EISENHAMMER, RODICK & KOHN
3	LLP, by MR. JASON T. MANNING and MS. KATHERINE A. LAROSA,
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5	appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, Board of Education of Winfield School District 34;
6	PETRARCA, GLEASON, BOYLE & IZZO, LLC, by
7	MR. JAMES DOUGHERTY,
8	appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Board of
9	Education of Community High School District 94;
10	ROBBINS SCHWARTZ, by
11	MR. DAVID J. FREEMAN and MR. NEAL SMITH,
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13	appeared on behalf of the Village of Winfield.
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1 THE COURT: Line ten, 21 CH 454, School 2 District of Winfield, Board of Directors -- or 3 Board of Education vs. The Village of Winfield. 4 MR. SMITH: Good morning, your Honor. Neal 5 Smith for the Village of Winfield. 6 THE COURT: Good morning. 7 MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, David Freeman on 8 behalf of the Village as well. But, Judge, must 9 as a practical matter, this is going to be an 10 argument, I believe, on a TRO. We're more than 11 happy to go first, but I don't know if you want 12 to take anybody who has real --13 THE COURT: Martha just called you first. 14 I didn't say you were going to argue right now. 15 MR. FREEMAN: Oh, okay. My apologies. David Freeman on behalf of the Village. 16 17 MR. MANNING: Good morning, your Honor. Jason Manning on behalf of the Plaintiff, Board 18 19 of Education District 34. 20 MS. LAROSA: Good morning, your Honor. 21 Katherine LaRosa also on behalf of Plaintiff, 22 District 34. 23 MR. DOUGHERTY: And good morning, your 24 Honor. Jim Dougherty on behalf of District 94.

1 THE COURT: All right. The Court is ready 2 to hear argument on this; however, I will push 3 this to the end of the call. 4 MR. MANNING: Thank you. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. 5 MR. 6 MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 7 MS. LAROSA: Thank you, Judge. 8 MR. SMITH: Thank you. 9 (WHEREUPON, other court 10 business was conducted 11 after which the following 12 further proceedings were 13 had herein:) 14 THE CLERK: 21 CH 454, School District of 15 Winfield 34, Board of Education, Village of 16 Winfield. 17 MR. SMITH: Good morning again, your Honor. 18 Neal Smith for the Village of Winfield. MR. FREEMAN: 19 Good morning again, your 20 Honor. David Freeman on behalf of the Village 21 as well. 22 MR. MANNING: Good morning, your Honor. 23 Jason Manning on behalf of the Plaintiff, School 24 District 34.

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1 MS. LAROSA: Good morning, Judge. 2 Katherine LaRosa on behalf of School District 3 34. 4 MR. DOUGHERTY: And good morning, your Honor. Jim Dougherty on behalf of District 94. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Very good. This comes on for Plaintiff, Winfield School District 7 34's motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction 8 9 in connection with a March 21st village meeting 10 today with respect to a proposed vote on an 11 allocation of TIF funds to a proposed bakery 12 going to the first floor of the CDH building 13 south of Jewel is what I believe. 14 All right. Counsel, I've had a chance 15 to read the motion, review many of these 16 exhibits. I'll give you a chance to go ahead 17 and address the Court at this time. I may have some questions. Counsel, I'll certainly give 18 you a chance to respond. Keeping in mind --19 20 MR. MANNING: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Keeping in mind, I think that 22 everyone here knows this. Obviously a TRO is 23 based on the pleadings alone, and this is not an 24 evidentiary hearing.

1 MR. MANNING: Sure. Thank you, your Honor. 2 Just at the outset, I think what you've captured 3 as the issue is exactly right. The agenda was 4 posted. I learned of it on Monday that this 5 action was coming up this evening. We properly 6 filed. We reached out to try and see if we 7 could avoid motion practice. That was 8 unsuccessful. So at the -- One of the arguments I 9 10 expect the Village will make -- I want to 11 address this at the outset -- is that they -- I 12 expect them to argue that this is legislative 13 action beyond the purview of your Honor's review 14 in a court of equity. And that's simply not the 15 case pursuant to Ziller vs. Rossi, which we cite in our motion, a Second District Appellate Court 16 17 case, where the Court addressed the same 18 argument raised by a Township arguing very 19 similar facts. Agenda came out. Plaintiffs 20 came in to challenge board action that was 21 upcoming. And the trial court and the Appellate 22 Court both rejected that argument because the 23 challenge in that case, as here, is tied back to 24 the original legislative action, the ordinances

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that created TIF 2 back in 2021. What we're seeking to enjoin is further action implementing or enforcing those ordinances, which is what that action on the Board's agenda tonight would do.

THE COURT: I'll let the Village address that, if they wish. But legislative action is enjoined routinely by courts. Not to say it's not extraordinary; but as a general rule, the Court doesn't need a ton of argument on that.

MR. MANNING: Sure. I just wanted to clarify that. We exchanged a couple of e-mails on it. I wanted that addressed at the outset. In terms of the four elements in favor of a TRO, likelihood of success or -- Let me start here, ascertainable -- legal ascertainable right in need of protection. I think there's no doubt that a school district as a taxing body is clearly impacted by the expenditure of property tax dollars that would have otherwise flowed to the school district, but for the creation of the TIF, which is exactly what's at dispute here.

The TIF dollars that the Village is seeking to approve expenditure tomorrow night

1 are directly at dispute in this case. It's the 2 lawsuit that we filed seeking to dissolve the 3 TIF. 4 With respect to likelihood of success on the merits, there are a number of 5 6 different -- a number of different issues that 7 we raise in the pleading, but the primary one I'll focus on is the but-for test. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, counsel, when I read your 10 motion, the -- what I didn't see in the 11 likelihood of success on the merits is the 12 standard for a likelihood of success on the 13 merits in a TRO context, which is simply a fair 14 question -- a fair question of success. 15 This -- this read almost like a merits brief. And, again, the Court will not resolve 16 17 the merits of an issue on a TRO. So there will be no advisory opinion here on the but-for test. 18 19 I can assure you that. 20 MR. MANNING: Understood. And to the 21 extent it came across that way --THE COURT: I'm not saying you haven't 22 23 satisfied the fair question issue. 24 MR. MANNING: Yeah. and --

1	THE COURT: But it did give me pause to say
2	why you know, we've got three and a half
3	pages deep on the but-for test here, and I think
4	the question is simply is there a fair
5	question
6	MR. MANNING: Sure.
7	THE COURT: in which there's a
8	reasonable likelihood your client may proceed on
9	the merits.
10	MR. MANNING: Sure. And just to be clear,
11	I thought we We did cite on page 8 of our
12	motion
13	THE COURT: Let me see.
14	MR. MANNING: that the party must raise
15	a fair question as to each element. It's the
16	very end of the legal standard.
17	THE COURT: I suppose that's technically
18	right.
19	MR. MANNING: And I apologize if that was
20	confusing or didn't come through as clear as we
21	wished it would have.
22	THE COURT: Well, yeah. I mean, the reason
23	I raise it is because as I'm reading this, I'm
24	trying to figure out what what is the

1 Because I've down countless TROs. 2 MR. MANNING: Sure. 3 THE COURT: Merits type briefing on 4 something like that where we're coming back in a 5 month on (f)(3) deposition scheduling strikes 6 the Court as -- It just struck me as 7 interesting, so I wanted to address that. 8 MR. MANNING: Sure. And we just -- First of all, we put this together very quickly in an 9 10 effort to get before you, your Honor. And we 11 wanted to be sure you understood how we believe 12 we've been -- we've established a fair question 13 as to a likelihood of success on the but-for 14 test. Most of that is set out in our complaint. 15 But, you know, it's undisputed at this point 16 that over \$80 million was committed by CDH well 17 in advance of --18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. MANNING: -- the creation of TIF 2. 20 They own well over the majority of the parcels 21 in the TIF 2 area. 22 THE COURT: I want to jump right to the 23 heart of where I think the dispute here is. Why 24 is there no legal -- Why is there no adequate

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remedy at law?

MR. MANNING: Sure. And that's a very good question, and the simple answer is this is a lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief. There is no claim for money damages --

> THE COURT: But let's think about that. MR. MANNING: -- at the end.

THE COURT: If -- If -- If this Court found that a TRO was appropriate -- If the Court found that there's no adequate remedy at law based solely on what the complaint seeks, that would incentivize Plaintiffs to seek only equitable relief where otherwise money damages might satisfy in order to obtain injunctive relief where it otherwise wouldn't -- wouldn't lie.

So, in other words, whether your complaint seeks it or not strikes the Court as that can't be the test.

MR. MANNING: Sure. And that was just the first part of my argument on that point.

THE COURT: Okay.

22 MR. MANNING: That is not the exclusive 23 argument.

THE COURT: Well, you led with it.

1	MR. MANNING: I understand. But I think it
2	is important because these types of cases, there
3	really isn't a cause of action to seek money
4	damages. What we have at issue here are
5	property tax dollars that are collected on an
6	annual basis that would normally flow through
7	pro rata to all entitled taxing districts,
8	school districts, park districts, et cetera.
9	And when a TIF is created, there's
10	incremental or increased taxes that are
11	collected after the base here as values go up.
12	Instead of going pro rata to the taxing
13	districts, they get funneled to the district and
14	to a specific TIF fund account to be held. And
15	what we have here is a very specific fund of
16	dollars, annual property tax revenues, that
17	can't be recollected if we win in this case and
18	the Village has spent those monies. We can't go
19	back out and recollect the money from the
20	taxpayers who are paying those taxes. And
21	there's We've looked at the TIF Act, the
22	Property Tax Code, and done plenty of research
23	to try to figure out if there would be some
24	cause of action if at the end of this case the

1 Village had spent all this money, is there a 2 mechanism to get that money back? There isn't. 3 There's nothing in the TIF Act. 4 THE COURT: Let's talk about that for a The dollar amount -- In this TRO the 5 second. 6 dollar amount the Village -- Based on the allegations in the TRO, motion for TRO, the 7 8 Village is on the brink of approving \$100,000 of 9 tax increment financing for a bakery that signed 10 a lease in the CDH office building. 11 So we have a finite dollar amount at 12 issue here. And I want to make sure I 13 understand it. It's the District's position 14 that if it were to prevail on the underlying 15 merits here and the Court finds that the TIF ordinance of TIF 2 is invalid, that there's no 16 17 remedy at law that would allow them to recoup 18 that \$100,000 from the -- from the Village? 19 MR. MANNING: That is our position. I --20 We don't have a -- It's not a contract dispute, 21 and I have a contractual entitlement --22 THE COURT: There's no equitable claim? 23 MR. MANNING: Not that I'm aware of. 24 Unjust enrichment is a quasi contractual claim.

1 THE COURT: All right. So now let's ask --2 Let's see what -- what the Village thinks. 3 MR. SMITH: Well, my position would be the 4 statute also doesn't provide for return of the 5 money if it's currently in the TIF fund. So if 6 their position -- if they're waiving any kind of 7 claim for money damage -- and I don't think they 8 are -- I think their motion is saying we want 9 We want the fund, the TIF fund, damages. preserved so that we can bring it back to us. 10 11 They want damages. This is about damages. 12 THE COURT: Hold on. I just want -- I want 13 my question kind of addressed here. 14 MR. SMITH: Okay. 15 THE COURT: If the Court were to find -- if 16 the Court were to deny the TRO today and the 17 Village were to go ahead and approve the TIF 18 financing and the Court later on determines that 19 TIF 2 is invalid, is it your position that they 20 would have no remedy for the TIF financing? 21 MR. SMITH: This is -- this is a chancery 22 court that has broad equitable powers. I think 23 it's a tool in your toolbox to make them whole. 24 I mean, damages is what they seek; and I think

1	that a court of equity has that power.
2	THE COURT: Well, instead of saying damages
3	what they seek, I just I think we're going to
4	get lost in the weeds there. They're not going
5	to agree with that.
6	MR. SMITH: To answer your Yeah.
7	THE COURT: That's not what we're here for.
8	MR. SMITH: To answer your question, I
9	think this is a court of equity. And I've seen
10	it before, and I think they have that power
11	to
12	THE COURT: Would you agree that your
13	client
14	MR. SMITH: fashion the remedy.
15	THE COURT: would potentially be liable
16	for that money if the Court were to A lot of
17	times when parties say, hey, Judge, we deny the
18	TRO we think you should deny the TRO because
19	there's an adequate remedy at law; and if we
20	lose on the underlying case, they would they
21	would have that remedy, is the Village willing
22	to go that far?
23	MR. SMITH: It would be wrong. I think
24	that we would vigorously oppose that; however,

we think it's a tool in your toolbox to order that remedy. So it's available for a remedy. That's the standard of a TRO, is there an available remedy. And the answer is, yes, there's an available remedy. This is a court of equity. That money is there. We're going to oppose it.

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THE COURT: So I've got the Village on the record saying, yeah, look, if it's invalid, this Court has the authority to order the Village to reimburse the \$100,000.

12 MR. MANNING: I just want to be clear 13 because I thought I heard them -- Although 14 they're saying that on one hand, they're saying 15 they would oppose that remedy as well. And I 16 have not -- I'm not sure what that remedy looks 17 like. I mean, is it an injunction ordering them 18 to pay any money they've spent? THE COURT: A mandatory injunction? 19 20 MR. MANNING: Reimburse all money you've 21 spent out of the TIF fund. 22 THE COURT: Restitution. 23 MR. MANNING: The other problem that we 24 have with this is that we're not the only taxing body impacted. It's all other taxing bodies. We've got two school districts in. There are other taxing bodies who have not intervened in this case, who, if this TIF district is declared illegal, we'd also be entitled to pro rata distribution. And there's got to be a mechanism for unwinding that. The County Collector can do that. The County Treasurer can do that. If the TIF is dissolved and the money goes back, it would be distributed pro rata to all parties. It seems to me that the only remedy to

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ensure that everybody's protected until this case is decided on the merits, is to enjoin the expenditure of those funds until we know whether it's legal or illegal. If it is illegal, which we contend it is, then there's a mechanism to work with the County to ensure the funds that are in that TIF fund go back to the County and are distributed out the way they were supposed to be in the first place. I know of no other way to do that, especially with some of the other parties not even before the Court.

23 MR. SMITH: Counsel's here saying there's
24 no statutory way for you to give the money back,

but counsel -- but counsel is here saying the money in the TIF fund, the Village's TIF fund, needs to be preserved so that it can be given back. But there's no statutory procedure for that either. So counsel on the one hand is saying there's no statutory procedure for us to get money back if you spend \$100,000, but they're asking for a TIF fund to be preserved so they can get that money back. But there's no procedure for that either. That's why they're wrong. I mean, this is a court of equity. The Court has powers to do both.

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THE COURT: Why don't we -- why don't we work through the prongs of a TRO. And I want to see where -- I think there may be some issues, some prongs, that the Village wouldn't highly dispute, ascertainable right. But adequate remedy at law, irreparable harm, likelihood of success, why don't you address each of those.

20 MR. SMITH: So on the likelihood of success 21 on the merits and the ascertainable right, we're 22 talking about a legislative enactment here. 23 Again, the legislative enactment from 2021 that 24 this Court must presume is valid. I mean,

1 legislation is presumed valid unless they meet a 2 high -- a very high threshold that the Village's 3 action is arbitrary. And so do they have a 4 clear and ascertainable right? Do they have a 5 likelihood of success on the merits? No. No. 6 They're challenging legislation. They're trying 7 to do the thing that requires the highest burden of proof there is, and that is beat back and say 8 9 that the Village's action was arbitrary. 10 THE COURT: I think it's important for the 11 Village to address the Court's concern about 12 whether or not there's an adequate remedy at law 13 here. And counsel's point is well-taken when he 14 says I hear on the one hand that while the Court 15 can do whatever it wants, so, yes, there is; but we would vehemently oppose the Court doing that. 16 17 Is there any -- is there a way for the Village to speak with clarity on the position of is --18 19 should this fail because there is an adequate 20 remedy at law, or do you essentially agree that, 21 you know, for other reasons it should fail, but 22 there is no adequate remedy at law? 23 MR. SMITH: Well, that goes -- that goes 24 back to the points we've been going back and

forth on already, is that this is a -- this is about damages. This is about money. And courts don't enjoin, don't enter Injunctions when money is available when the amount of damages is clearly ascertainable. There's going to be a precise accounting on this. The Village has to report it to the Illinois Controller's Office. There's going to be a precise reporting about every single penny that is spent and given to the bakery, as they -- as they claim the funds under the agreement.

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We are going to know precisely the amount that is given to the bakery. And so there's -- So that's one of the things. Sometimes courts enter an injunction when that is unknowable or likely to be unknowable. That is precisely knowable in this case.

18 THE COURT: When you say that, why don't
19 you just be clear again about what you believe
20 is precisely knowable with respect to how the
21 funds are used with the bakery.

22 MR. SMITH: The amount that is given to the 23 bakery --

THE COURT: No.

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1	MR. SMITH: The amount under the contract
2	that will be given to the bakery is precisely
3	knowable. The bakery will make requests to the
4	Village.
5	THE COURT: All right.
6	MR. SMITH: They'll say here's a TIF
7	reimbursable expense for
8	THE COURT: So there's a pod there's a
9	pod up to 100k.
10	MR. SMITH: Right.
11	THE COURT: They'll build the place out
12	seeking reimbursement
13	MR. SMITH: Yeah. Yeah. They Yeah. I
14	mean, there's an exhibit to the agreement is
15	what they can ask for, TIF eligible expenses.
16	THE COURT: Right.
17	MR. SMITH: For instance, commercial
18	plumbing. They'll submit they will submit a
19	reimbursement request to the Village. The
20	Village will issue a payment to them and will
21	know to the penny the amount that is.
22	THE COURT: And
23	MR. SMITH: After that, we'll have to
24	report it to the Illinois Controller's

1 THE COURT: Is it the Village's position 2 that there is no issue of how that money in the 3 event the Court were to find TIF 2 to be 4 invalid, how that money would need to be 5 allocated to the various taxing bodies? There 6 would be no issue in determining that? 7 MR. SMITH: I -- I -- If -- I don't -- I'm 8 not sure I'm following the question. Is it --9 Do you mean do we go back to the County Clerk, 10 for instance, for them to distribute the money? 11 THE COURT: Well, District 34 is in here 12 saying, hey, wait a minute. That's money that 13 belongs to taxing bodies because, again, it's 14 their broader view that a TIF is unnecessary to 15 develop this area of property. Therefore, 16 you're depriving various taxing bodies of tax 17 revenue that it would otherwise receive, but for this TIF. 18 Let's assume the Court, just for the 19 20 sake of the argument, were to find that TIF --21 you know, at some point way down the road, that 22 TIF 2 is invalid, but the Court denied this TRO 23 because it found there's an adequate remedy of

law, it's all money. Is it the Village's

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position that it could adequately disburse, once it's recouped or put that money back into whatever bucket the taxing bodies would normally draw from, could the Village adequately -- or accurately -- that's a better way to phrase it -- disburse that money to the various taxing bodies in an amount they would normally have received? Does that make sense?

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MR. SMITH: It does. And I think the answer to that is the Court has the equitable authority to do that. The Court could order a remedy. The Court has the inherent authority to order a remedy like that.

14 THE COURT: Let me ask you. This is just a 15 question. Is -- is the money earmarked for the TIF right now being held in a way that is 16 17 technically -- you know, depriving these various taxing bodies of tax revenue? Because what I'm 18 19 wondering is -- What I'm asking about now in the 20 event this thing gets undone later down the 21 road, isn't that ultimately going to -- is that 22 ultimately going to have to happen no matter 23 what if the Court finds it invalid? Let's say 24 the Court grants your motion and then turns

1 around and finds it invalid, are we going to 2 have to go through this step of trying to figure 3 out how much each taxing body would have 4 received from this bucket no matter what? 5 MR. MANNING: We will, and --6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. MANNING: -- there's a mechanism for 8 doing that. We'd have to go back to the County. 9 They're the ones that are in charge. THE COURT: Okay. So that's what we would 10 11 do here. Let's say the Court denied the TRO, 12 found it invalid down the road, we would go back 13 to the County. The bucket of the money would 14 have to be replenished by the Village, and we'd 15 go back to the County, right? 16 MR. MANNING: I expect that that is what 17 would have to happen. I think that the problem 18 is is once those property tax dollars are gone, 19 there's no -- there's no guarantee of when, if 20 ever, those funds ever come back to the Village. 21 The Village isn't just -- not a private 22 corporation. They're funded through property 23 tax revenue just like every other taxing body. 24 And if, God forbid, we end up with a million

1 plus dollars, how long -- These taxing bodies 2 are being deprived already. But the harm then 3 is they will continue to be deprived of that 4 money until the Village can come up with whatever dollar amount that is, \$100,000, 500, 5 6 one million, plus for how long. And there are 7 cases where courts have certainly entered 8 injunctions where there's a discrete specific 9 sum of money, which is exactly what we have here 10 that is at dispute and courts have enjoined it. 11 It's not just -- Just because money's involved 12 doesn't mean an injunction cannot issue. 13 THE COURT: I understand that. 14 MR. MANNING: We cited one of those cases 15 in our brief, the <u>All Seasons Excavating Company</u> There's others I can cite for you as 16 case. 17 well. So it isn't simply because it's money, we 18 can't enjoin the disbursement of the funds, 19 whereas here we've got a -- It's not -- a 20 specific fund of property tax dollars that is 21 finite. It's knowable. It can be preserved and 22 should be preserved in our view in order to 23 ensure that all the taxing bodies, including the 24 school districts, are able to access those funds

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1 as quickly as possible once -- if we're correct 2 and prevail on a ruling on the merits. 3 MR. SMITH: And counsel is asking you to 4 eliminate every single uncertainty, to eliminate 5 any kind of heartburn that they may have; and 6 that's not what an injunctive remedy like a TRO 7 is for. There's an adequate remedy at law. 8 This is just a classic case of money. Ιf 9 anybody else came in and said enjoin the 10 expenditure of money, that's not what it's for. 11 It's not -- You're not here to eliminate every 12 single litigation uncertainty and to eliminate 13 their nervousness. I think it's misplaced; but 14 that's not the job of a TRO, especially when 15 there's an adequate remedy at law, money, a 16 mechanism for this Court to replenish that fund 17 and the County to redistribute the money. 18 THE COURT: All right. The Court's 19 considered the arguments, as well as the motion

considered the arguments, as well as the motion and exhibits. The Court will go through the four factors quickly. Well, I shouldn't say quickly, but will do its best to succinctly address each of the four factors here.

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I'm going to take the four factors as

they appear in Movants' brief. First, one of the factors is that the Defendants -- that the Movants here seeking the TRO, Plaintiffs in this case, are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The test in the context of a TRO is that a party must raise a fair question as to each element required to obtain the relief, a fair question as to success on the merits. It's not particularly high barred. The Court finds in this case the District is likely to succeed on the merits. The Court also finds that the District has a clear, ascertainable right in need of protection because they have raised a fair question about the existence of the right; and the argument is that the Plaintiff -- that the Court should maintain the status quo. However, when we turn to irreparable

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18 injury, adequate remedy at law, often times
19 courts will consider those arguments kind of in
20 conjunction with each other. And here, the
21 Court finds that there is an adequate remedy at
22 law. The amounts in controversy are \$100,000 -23 up to \$100,000, not necessarily more than that,
24 but not necessarily up to that. The Court finds

that if they, the Village, issues TIF funding to the bakery and it turns out TIF 2 is held to be invalid, there's an adequate remedy at law for the taxing bodies, including District 34, to seek relief in a court of competent jurisdiction for those monies that should not have been spent and should have been properly distributed to the taxing bodies as originally planned.

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In that regard the Court finds that 9 10 there is no significant or meaningful 11 irreparable injury because the taxing bodies can 12 be compensated by money later on down the road 13 if at all appropriate. That does not mean --14 and counsel's entirely correct -- that whenever 15 money is at issue or whenever there's a dollar 16 amount in question, an injunction can never 17 issue. That's not the case. But in this case 18 we have specific facts. The Village has 19 indicated that this Court absolutely can issue 20 an order requiring a village to repay that 21 money. The Court does not find that the lack of a claim for money damages in the complaint 22 23 precludes an adequate remedy at law, nor does 24 the Court find that the villages are -- that the

1 taxing bodies are limited to proceed only under 2 the TIF Act against the villages, if it turns 3 out that they believe they are entitled to money 4 damages as a result of an improper distribution or allocation of funds due to an invalid TIF. 5 6 So for those reasons -- And let me 7 just add, the balance of public interest, public 8 harm, the Court finds it to be somewhat neutral 9 here because Illinois courts do not favor 10 injunctions which prohibit public bodies from 11 functioning. That does not mean that public 12 bodies cannot do certain -- engage in certain 13 acts or pass legislation that is subject to 14 injunctive relief. That happens. 15 The Court is also mindful of the fact 16 that school districts, among other taxing 17 bodies, do suffer public harm when tax dollars 18 are not allocated to them that should be. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the public 19 20 harm or public interest prong of this really is 21 kind of neutral here on this one. And so 22 because the Court finds that there is an 23 adequate remedy at law based on what is pled 24 before the Court, the Court will deny the TRO.

1	So, cou	insel, if you could prepare an
2	order to that ef	fect. Thank you, both.
3	MR. MANNING	Yes, your Honor.
4	MR. SMITH:	Thank you.
5	THE COURT:	Thank you for your brief.
6	MR. MANNING:	I'll prepare it.
7	THE COURT:	Thank you both.
8	MR. FREEMAN:	Thank you, your Honor.
9	MR. DOUGHERT	TY: Thank you.
10	MS. LAROSA:	Thank you, Judge.
11		(WHICH were all of the
12		proceedings had at the
13		hearing of the above-
14		entitled cause, this date
15		and time aforesaid.)
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1	STATE OF ILLINOIS)	
2) SS: COUNTY OF DU PAGE)	
3		
4	I, LISA M. NOVAK, hereby certify	
5	that I am a Certified Shorthand Official Court	
6	Reporter assigned to transcribe the	
7	computer-based digital recording of proceedings	
8	had of the above-entitled cause, Administrative	
9	Order No. 99–12, and Local Rule 1.01(d). I	
10	further certify that the foregoing, consisting of	
11	Pages 1 to 31, inclusive, is a true and accurate	
12	transcript hereinabove set forth.	
13		
14	Lisa Novak	
15	Official Court Reporter Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois	
16	DuPage County Certificate # 84-4296	
17	Certificate # 64-4296	
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