West Orange -Cove Consolidated Independent School District

Site Security and Threat Assessment

West Orange- Stark High School

Rolanda Holifield, Principal

1400 Newton Street

Orange, Texas 77630

Security Consultant: Darryl C. Hunt

Police Chief WOCCISD Police Department

March 5, 2020

Author: D. Hunt

This report is intended solely for the use of West Orange – Cove Consolidated Independent School District and should not be recreated or copied for use at facilities or sites other than the sites assessed in this document without prior written permission from WOCCISD

This document is considered CONFIDENTIAL and should be safeguarded and the information contained within protected.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The following information documents the Security and Threat Assessment conducted for the WOCCISD West Orange -Stark High School complex located at, 1400 Newton Street, Orange, Tx.77630, and was conducted on site on March 5, 2020.

The West Orange -Stark High School complex consists of 1 main primary building, athletics complex, and a career center for high school students the district has 412 employees and 590 students at this High School complex.

This document contains a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the current physical and operational conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. Recommendations are included for consideration to improve overall security and reduce risks to personnel, operations, and facilities through implementation of countermeasures and mitigating strategies to detect and deter threats.

The scope of the assessment is limited to the physical and operational security of the WOCCISD school campuses and does not include a "Multi-Hazards" approach addressing other risk conditions such as environmental, cyber, or economic risks. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate existing security conditions relative to the physical components of the facilities and the operational plans and protocols in place to respond to potential acts of violence.

Recommendation for mitigating identified risks is based on industry best practices, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Association of School Boards, and the Texas State University School Safety Center.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a set of design principles used to discourage crime and promote building security. CPTED principles are based on anticipating the thought processes of a potential offender and creating an environment that discourages follow-through. CPTED has the added advantage of creating a sense of security and well-being among employees and tenants.

CPTED follows four principles of design;

Natural Surveillance

Criminals do not like to be seen or recognized, so they will choose situations where they can hide and easily escape.

Natural Access Control

Criminals like to feel that they are in control. However, this sense of control can be denied by clearly marking the approaches to buildings and properties and channeling visitors into a defined area.

Territorial Reinforcement

The purpose of this principle is to create a clear distinction between public and private property. This is important for two reasons: Legitimate occupants have a sense of ownership and will notice, and even challenge, people who don't belong; intruders, on the other hand, have a harder time blending in.

Maintenance

Maintenance is related to territorial reinforcement. A well-maintained area sends the message that people notice and care about what happens in an area. This, in turn discourages vandalism and other crimes. Security practitioners refer to the "Broken Windows Theory," the idea that one broken window will entice vandals to break another. A vandalized area then becomes more inviting to higher levels of crime. A property should be well-maintained as a matter of safety as well as pride.

Target Hardening

Target hardening is another strategy often mentioned in connection with CPTED. This simply means making a building more difficult to forcibly enter.

WOCCISD- CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

CPTED Principle	Rating
Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Needs Improvement
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Needs Improvement
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Needs Improvement
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Needs Improvement
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

WOCCISD - CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Needs Improvement
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Needs Improvement
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Needs Improvement
Territorial Reinforcement	Good

Rating scheme

Excellent	Very high quality or standards for security and or safety.
Very Good	High quality or standards for security and or safety.
Good	Exceeds standards for security and or safety.
Average	Meets standards for security and or safety.
Needs Improvement	Does not meet standards for security and or safety
Deficient	Lacking standards and is inadequate for security and or safety.

Author: D. Hunt

Layers and Rings of Protection

Layers of protection represent procedural and physical countermeasures that protect assets. The following categories are associated with layers of protection designed to provide an acceptable level of security for personnel and the facility itself.

External

1.   Facility Complex Access Control (Gates, Signage, Guard, Traffic Routing, etc..)

2.   Building Access Control (Electronic badge access, mechanical locks, etc.)

3.   Video Surveillance system (cameras)

4.   Environmental Design (building compound arrangement)

5.   Maintenance and activity support

6.   Fencing and parking gates

7.   Signage

8.   Lighting

9.   Locked utilities

10.   Security Personnel Patrols

Internal

1.   Associate Badge System (electronic, physical ID's, other)

2.   Campus Security Officer/

3.   Centralized access points and entrances

4.   Visitor check in and checkout procedures

5.   Associate hiring and screening procedures

6.   Secured internal layers of doors, locks and authorized areas

7.   Camera monitoring

8.   Door alarms

9.   Motion sensor devices

10.   Lighting

11.   High visibility and open work areas

12.   Locked entrances to electrical, utility, plant and maintenance areas

13.   Personnel accountability system

14.   Key controls

15.   Asset and inventory controls

16.   Interior maintenance and activity support

17.   Fire Suppression systems

18.   Alarm and alert systems

19.   Associate policies, procedures and training programs

20.   Communications systems (redundant)

21.   Emergency and crisis plan, procedures and controls

Potential Threats or Losses

These are a list of potential security threats that may impact safety and security of the facility and or personnel.

1.   Workplace violence

2.   External sabotage

3.   Internal sabotage

4.   Terrorist attack

5.   Systems or facility tampering

6.   Theft

7.   Robbery

8.   Assault

9.   Explosion

10.   Abduction

11.   Arson

12.   Vandalism

Physical Security

A review of the physical security conditions at the West Orange – Stark High School complex addressed the facility environment from an "outside – in" approach. This considers the facility

geographic layout relative to the design's ability to mitigate potential security risks from the outside, and migrates to the specific physical and procedural security mechanisms on site designed to protect personnel and assets.

The West Orange Stark High School overall physical security assessment is" Below Average"

External Physical Security:

1. Findings: The West Orange -Stark High School complex is unique in school designs the upstairs are only covers 1/3 of the building on the top floor with eight class rooms "security positive", adequate security measures have not been taken to capitalize on the design. Access to the property by both vehicular and foot traffic is uninhibited and easily obtained on all sides of the property. Numerous roadways and unfenced wooded areas allow for open access. No access gates, fencing, guards, or signage exists to deter unauthorized entry or to channel persons to a centralized reception area. The open and uncontrolled access creates a significant security risk allowing a person or persons to enter the property unchallenged and have direct access to all areas of the school. In addition to the open access onto the property, the buildings themselves at several locations are unlocked during school hours which will be addressed later in this document.
2. Video surveillance cameras were observed around several of the buildings and provided more than ample coverage of the perimeter areas; however, coverage was limited or nonexistent for road access points of the perimeter areas. At the time of the assessment, all of the campus cameras are functioning...

Recommendations:

- Install gates or gate arms at all points of roadway access onto the property. Identify a single-entry point and create a channelized traffic flow directing vehicles to the appropriate parking areas. This can be completed through a variety of means, each with varying degrees of effectiveness such as, parking lot redesign, physical barriers, barrels/cones, painted lines, and signage
- Designate visitor parking area and install adequate signage directing persons where to park and where to enter the building
- Consider erecting security fencing around the buildings to reduce access to the areas of highest concern – where the students are most of the time, If financially feasible, erect fencing with signage around entire property
- Additional external cameras are needed to provide full visibility of driveways, property perimeters, and all sides of existing buildings. (The camera system itself will be addressed separately)

- Parking should be monitored and enforced. Consider windshield parking stickers or hangars with designation of role, i.e., student, faculty, contractor, etc.

Access Control (Listed as the number 1 security recommendation by the TEA for the 2019 school year)

2.1. Findings: No formal access control exists for the property or buildings. Check in procedures for visitors were on an honor system but not actively enforced. The size of the community allowed for familiarity with most persons entering the property which lends itself to a false sense of security.
In many past school violence incidents, the perpetrators were either students or former students and recognized by those on the property. Familiarity does not equate to authorized presence.

2.2. Recommendations: Access control needs to be assessed based on the level of acceptable risk and level of security desired. Despite the age of the buildings and the multiple variations in doors and locks, several options exist to enhance the access control deficiencies.

An electronic access control badge system has been installed to provide a high level of monitored and vetted access for all persons and ensures the area of building is covered by the system should be maintained in a secure mode. It has an inherent weakness from the human element from people holding doors but our current systems are not alarmed to notify when a door has been left open. The system should be monitored by security personnel.

 West Orange -Stark High School would benefit from an on-site event monitoring system and personnel, an access control process that is both procedural and electronic makes the most sense. In adopting a layered approach in developing a security program, the philosophy follows that the site creates layers of barriers designed to deter, detect, and respond to possible threats. Access Control is but one of those layers and when coupled with the previously mentioned property access remedies, adds that additional layer in preventing further and deeper access into the facility.

- It is recommended a single point of entry be established for all visitors, to include parents, former students, contractors, etc., and clear and visible signage be posted directing persons to that area.

- Visitors should present valid ID and have a verified reason as well as a specific person they are meeting prior to being issued a visitors' badge. The badge should list location authorized to be visited

- All visitors should be escorted by an employee or student office aid if possible.

An electronic visitor tracking system should be employed for establishing and maintaining a database of visitors. A standardized Regional system could maintain a centralized database of visitors and provide alerts for persons who could pose a risk. Such a system when employed on a common network ties all school facilities together to identify visitors, reduce costs of purchasing, and general maintenance of the system

Video Management System (VMS) – *Security cameras*

3. **Findings:** West Orange Stark High School is equipped with 193 cameras operating on a Video Insight software system installed August 2019. Cameras are mounted both internally and externally of new cameras on the same network. Coverage by external cameras does adequately cover all buildings and parking lot that has public access areas onto the property. No perimeter coverage exists for the rear or the north side of the CTE complex, to include the Tennis court area.

   a. Camera quality is more than adequate during daytime and nighttime viewing (Good quality during low light) Installation of the cameras was of good quality.
   b. Administration of the system is sufficient (The inhouse IT team has adequate training or administrative rights to the system)
   c. It was unknown if original camera IP addresses were changed which can present vulnerabilities to the system
   d. Its also unknown if the district IT professional has inspected the Video software system for risks to the school network.

3.1. **Recommendations:** Video systems are for the most part a reactionary tool used for conducting investigations or obtaining information after an event. Few organizations conduct active monitoring of video systems and for this reason it is imperative the recording times for all cameras should have at least a 30-day storage period. The cameras themselves provide some level of deterrence since they are highly visible around the complex.

• Additional external cameras should be installed to ensure coverage on all sides of all buildings. Rather than continue with the same quality, style, and manufacturer camera units, consider using 270-degree cameras on building corners to provide full coverage along two sides of the building, thus leading to fewer cameras being installed.

• Require security vendor to provide documented formulas for how a particular camera type was selected to ensure the view meets the required quality (pixels on target). There is a mathematical formula for determining camera specifications to meet the requirements for each location. This ensures the right camera is used in each setting and is based on the area of coverage needed and the quality of picture obtained.

- Identify the recorded frame rate for each camera and ensure the recorded sample provides adequate quality (too low of a frame rate leads to choppy or unclear video with loss of activity coverage and too fast of a frame rate may eat up too much storage space for no reason)

- Conduct research on camera types and prices rather than being told what camera will be installed and what the cost is going to be (use competitive bids when possible)Establish procedures for conducting regular reviews of camera recordings and to verify functionality of the system. A common practice is to scroll through "critical" camera views each morning at an accelerated speed to identify any suspicious activity. This makes you aware of things you would otherwise have no idea had occurred, and shows which cameras are functioning properly.

- Ensure a district IT employee is trained to troubleshoot the video software and inspect network appliances to ensure serviceability. If this is not available, engage the security company to discuss a maintenance agreement or establish service call criteria and priorities.

- Recommend the district and/or region adopt a standardized video management system that can be interconnected on one network. This improves functionality, maintenance, familiarity with the operations, and ensures best pricing. Avoid using residential quality systems to save money – commercial quality exists for a reason and will last long enough to see a return on the investment.

Internal Physical Security:

Findings: In keeping with the layered approach of creating multiple security barriers, the physical aspects inside the buildings play a significant role in enhancing overall safety and security. Building on enhancements from exterior areas which are recommended to begin at the property perimeter boundaries, we have developed methods to deny and deter unwanted entry at the furthest points from personnel and assets as well as methods of early identification.

Each layer offers an opportunity to identify and interdict a threat before an adverse action is initiated and the enhancement of physical security inside the buildings creates additional layers on top of the external measures.

The following internal security findings were observed:

a. A functioning fire alarm system throughout the complex. Fire pull stations were in all buildings were functional. Fire extinguishers were not in an enclosed case, the sprinkler systems are installed in the buildings. It should be noted the auditors were advised the school passed all inspections.

b. The physical structure of doors and locks in all buildings were observed to be in good condition and in working order

c. Emergency exit doors were equipped with proper push bars and were locked

d. All classroom doors were able to be inspected and could be locked from the inside.

4.1 Recommendations: Overall the internal physical security structure of the site is Good. Lighting is good throughout the buildings and each building is equipped with adequate avenues for egress.

Recommendations for improving the overall internal security conditions as part of the layered security approach are more procedural than physical and will be addressed as a separate category. Physical enhancements are as follows:

• All classrooms should be equipped with a device that allows the door to be locked and prevent a forced entry. The school's "Lockdown – Lockout" procedures, teachers and staff should have the ability to create a safe "shelter in place" environment that denies entry to an intruder or other threat. Locking devices should be secured and in the control of a teacher or staff to prevent the unauthorized locking of a door

• For doors with glass panels, a drop-down window covering is recommended to prevent viewing into the room from outside in the event of a lockdown

• The ability to exit each room through a window should be considered when available. If windows do not open, a glass breakage device should be available

• Panic alarm activation buttons are installed at critical points throughout the school and at a minimum be installed in the main office, and the nurse's station and attendance causing a blue light to flash in the hallways.

<u>Policies and Procedures</u>

4. A critical part of any organization's security program are the documented emergency action plans, procedures, and policies designed to provide guidance and clarity to personnel so they can effectively manage events. Developing emergency action plans is most effective when the plans and procedures are part of a comprehensive Crisis Management Program which gives structure and support to the implantation of those plans and procedures.
   Under the Texas Unified School Safety and Security Standards issued by Texas State University, the development of a multi-hazard preparedness plan consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a requirement as listed in the Texas Education Code, 37.108, as well as being recommended in various FEMA guidance documents.

Although a Crisis Management Program is an all-hazards response program that extends beyond security related events, it is still a critical function for school security activities and plans an integral function in effectively planning for and responding to events.

Regardless of what the documents or procedures are named, it is important to develop plans and procedures to address how emergency events will be managed, who performs what tasks, who is in charge, etc. An emergency response plan can address the all-hazards issue and provide specific guidance through the different events, but this plan needs to be written and formally adopted by the organization. All personnel should be trained and held responsible for compliance with these plans. Whether there is one or multiple plans, areas that must be addressed are:

•Site Security – Assigning a responsible person to oversee the security program, update assessments, and ensure all security needs are addressed. Tasks can be delegated across multiple areas and persons but one person needs to own the program and ensure the tasks are completed and the security procedures are adhered to.

•Emergency Response – How the organization responds to a variety of events, from environmental events, to human hazard events. How does the organization prepare in advance to mitigate impact, how and who is managing the event while it is active, and how does the organization recover following an event. All of these things need to be considered and planned for as part of the Crisis Management Program.
   Such a program can be isolated within the district or part of a larger organizational support structure but it needs to be in place.

•Safety Plans/ Medical / Pandemic Plans
•MOU's – Does the organization have any MOU's with other agencies (government, NGO's, etc.). These plans should be included as part of the overall operational plans.

District Safety and Security Committee

• The Texas Education Code (Sec 37.109) suggest the formation of a safety and security committee as well as developing processes to identify and appropriately assist individuals who exhibit signs of violent, harmful, or risky behavior, and/or pose a threat of committing criminal activity.

• These initiatives highlight the need for a monitoring group to track information and monitor social media for information that would allow early interdiction into undesirable behavior that could escalate into violent action.

• The establishment of an online reporting site and/or call in number for people to report suspicious or unusual behavior or general concerns that can be followed up on is recommended. Early identification and intervention are crucial to preventing acts of violence

Author: D. Hunt

. **Critical Security Event Assessment – Active Shooter Events**

Active Shooter events are a major concern for all schools and no area of the country is exempt from these occurrences. Rural areas are no less susceptible than urban areas when it comes to this type of violent event. Several factors predicate the outcome should such an event occur. It should be noted that few facilities are 100% secure or inaccessible to a determined intruder so the actions taken when an event occurs will determine the outcome for the most part. Advance warning of the threat, the ability to deny access, and the ability to positively interdict the threat are of the utmost importance in reducing the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. A comprehensive action plan must be developed, trained, and practiced in order to create an effective program and deterrent to such events.

Several steps to consider in establishing such a program are:

 • Adopt an Active Shooter Awareness Training Program. Numerous programs currently exist and are available for use at no cost. Each has its own response perspective and selection should be based on the environment and culture of each organization. Examples of these are the, "Run, Hide, Fight" and "Avoid, Deny, Defend" programs. At a minimum, all staff should be given this awareness training and if acceptable, students should also be exposed to some or all of the training points.

• Operational Response Plans Developed – as part of the emergency response plans for the organization, clear response plans should be developed and practiced. These plans include notification methods (how the threat is communicated to everyone), lockdown or lockout procedures, shelter in place, creating safe areas, evacuation procedures, etc…

• Communication procedures in response to an active shooter can range from an audible alarm, PA system, emails, texts, bullhorns, and a variety of other methods. Careful consideration should be taken as to the most effective method that will get the message out without compromising the response plan to the intruder. *Cellular programs such as "WhatsApp" and "Signal" are good communication programs that can use group messaging to push messages out in a two-way communication. This can be more effective and reliable than hand held radios.*

• One major problem with an active shooter is identifying where he is, where he is moving to, and how to let everyone know so they can take effective evasive action. A recommendation from this auditor is to consider the electronic notification system for Active Shooter events known as, "ASR" or Active Shooter Response. This is an activation station similar to a fire pull station that when activated sends texts and emails to everyone in the system, to include emergency response personnel. The benefit of this type of system is the location of the shooter is identified by the activation station and each new activation identifies movement and a new location. Since response time to interdict an active shooter is critical, this immediate notification speeds up that notification process while at the same time allowing persons at the site to make informed decisions about movement away from the threat.

• As a follow on to the previous recommendation, past events have shown that most school shooting events end as soon as the shooter is confronted by an armed response. As such, the ability to interdict the action by inserting an armed responder is the most decisive action that can be taken to end the event. The previous recommendations throughout this assessment are all designed to create layers of security to "harden" the target by creating concentric rings of physical barriers to impede movement throughout the facility. Adding in robust response plans provides the proactive measure of moving people away from the threat

Together these actions constitute the organization's critical event response program or emergency response plan which is a critical part of effectively managing a violent action. A detailed description and recommendation for the ARMED response capability within the West Orange-Stark High School is as follows:

Armed Programs and Recommendations West Orange-Cove CISD

The State of Texas allows for the armed protection of our schools and has set forth the standards and requirements for the approved programs. It should be made very clear that the carrying of a firearm on school property is closely regulated in the State of Texas and the laws should be fully understood and complied with.

The State of Texas authorizes security responses under the authority of the Texas Education Code, Texas Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedures. Any action taken by West Orange-Cove CISD with regard to the adoption of one of the state's approved programs should be fully reviewed by the district's legal department and guidance issued by that department should be followed. The district assumes great liability in adopting and implementing an armed response program and should give careful consideration to the type of program being adopted, the level of training and support the district is willing to provide, existing response assets, and all mitigation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of an event.

The state of Texas offers several options to schools to provide armed protection and response. Each program has rules and regulations that must be complied with

See attached program information and link;(School Marshals and other District personnel Carrying Firearms).

• **School Marshall Program**

a.   Allows for one Marshall per site with 200 students in daily attendance

b.   Appointment of the Marshall is made by the Board of Trustees

c.   Requires specific law enforcement licensing and training

d.   Plainclothes position(armed) unless position as part of regular duties in direct contact with students – in this case the weapon must be locked up

e.   Requires use of specific ammunition (frangible)

Author: D. Hunt

- **<u>School Resource Officer (SRO) – Active Law Enforcement Officer</u>**

a. District may hire an on or off-duty law enforcement officer

b. Officer in uniform

c. May be a shared resource with other schools

- **<u>Guardian Program – Armed School Safety Employee</u>**

b. District grants written permission to carry a firearm on campus

c. Carries firearm not pursuant to a handgun license but by written authority under Section 46.03, Tx Att'y Gen Op No GA-1051.

d. School is mandated to coordinate with local law enforcement when having armed employees at the school (Tx Ed Code 37.108(a((3)

e. Additional training through state certified programs is recommended

f. School District assumes full liability for the armed employee's actions

- **<u>Private Security – Uniformed and armed security guard</u>**

a. District may hire a licensed private security company to provide a uniformed, armed guard to patrol campus

<u>Armed Personnel and Program Discussion</u>

The decision to consider having an armed presence at the school is a matter taken very seriously. A tremendous amount of liability comes with each program as well as with the decision to not use any of them. There are inherent flaws and risks with each program so they need to be carefully examined to determine which if any is appropriate for a given environment. Some items to consider in this discussion are:

a. Response time of local law enforcement
b. Capability of local law enforcement
c. School funding for program
d. Availability of qualified armed personnel (private or employee)
e. Emotional climate (parents, board members, general public, law enforcement)

In dissecting each program, there are positives and negatives to each which will be given a cursory discussion here;

Author: D. Hunt

School Marshall Program – This program brings a state certified peace officer with specific law enforcement training to the campus. The district hires this person so they have the opportunity to interview and assess the person. This is a plainclothes position and the Marshall is an employee of the district. They may carry a concealed firearm unless they have a dual role that brings them in direct contact with students, in which case they must lock their firearm up and it must be in close proximity to them at all times. The district incurs the cost of the Marshall as an added head count since they are employees. Those costs will include benefits in addition to salary which can drive the cost of the program beyond many district's funding ability.

District Police Department or School Resource Officer (SRO) – This program allows a district to enter into an MOU with a local law enforcement agency to hire officers to work in uniform either full or part time. Since a uniformed officer is a strong deterrent to a violent offender, this program offers great benefit in that the officer is not an employee, their actions are covered by their agency, as well as any injuries incurred while enforcing the law, and they present that key feature that an official presence can confront a perpetrator. Being uniformed and armed, employed by a government agency, not an added head count or subject to benefit packages, and trained to perform the function they are being hired to do makes this a highly desirable option.

Guardian Program – The school district selects an employee and authorizes them to be armed on school property. The district assumes full liability for the actions of this employee and may even pay an extra stipend for the person to perform this task. The state has a two day certification training program and requires the candidate to have a concealed handgun license in the State of Texas. One of several issues with this program is selecting and training an individual to enter a violent event with a firearm in order to take action to end the aggression.

This is a difficult task with professionally trained law enforcement personnel, let alone someone who has not encountered that type of environment. Added to this is the requirement that firearms proficiency for this environment far exceeds most police firearms training courses since there is a high probability of striking another person when shooting inside a school.

 Active Shooter events are dynamic, high stress events that require professional interdiction with no hesitation. That level of competence is difficult at best to obtain from the majority of available personnel for this program and should be considered as the last resort to an armed response, or possibly as a supplement to another program.

One operational positive to this program would be to implement it as a defensive action whereby the armed employee defended a room rather than aggressing against a perpetrator. Designated safe rooms could be defended by several armed employees who used the firearm as a last defense rather than exceeding their skill level or capability by moving directly to the threat.

Summary

Author: D. Hunt

In essence the overall security environment for the West Orange Cove CISD is rated as FAIR. The lack of historical events and a favorable social environment for the area helps support a relatively safe environment compared to many other areas. This environment has also fostered a lack of urgency to identify and correct some of the issues identified in this assessment and the congenial relationships harbor a false sense of security and safety.

In the security profession, Hope is not considered a strategy and as history has shown, active shooter events occur in environments similar to this one so it is incumbent on the district to make improvements, develop plans of action, provide training to personnel, engage the district police and local law enforcement to discuss response strategies, and engage the school board to develop a unified strategy.

Remaining cognizant of limited and competing resources, a prioritized list of actions should be developed. Items providing the best return in terms of enhanced security in relation to overall cost should be implemented first keeping in mind that many of the suggested remedies may be the lowest expenditures or may be procedural in nature.

Armed with a list of needed improvements, projected implementation and budget proposals can be developed. Not all items and deficiencies can be corrected immediately but a roadmap for taking positive action to enhance the overall security conditions can be developed and planned for.

Program Support:

A Security and Threat Assessment is a good start at evaluating risks and vulnerabilities; however, without supporting an organization through these improvements, it has little value. As a follow up to this initial assessment, The WOCCISD Police Department is prepared to support our district in developing emergency response plans and procedures, training personnel, assisting in managing table top exercises, and providing expert training should the district decide to pursue any above listed program on our campus (es).

Threat Assessments are site specific and even though they tend to have similarities in the areas being assessed, are still very individualistic with different variables. For most organizations, having individual assessments contracted can be cost prohibitive and, must be revisited periodically for they are not sustainable for a long-term program.

Assessments have a shelf life and should be reevaluated annually at a minimum. Performing these assessments requires specific training but that does not mean a school district cannot perform their own; it just requires them to be trained.

One approach is to offer a Train the Trainer (T3) Program to instruct selected district employees to conduct the assessments and follow through the process to include recommendations and action plans. Training a select group to perform this task guarantees the district can, over a long period, perform this valuable function and comply with state mandates that continue to develop in this arena. This approach offers considerable cost savings to the district versus contracting services for each site. The program and training can be made available should this be seen as a viable option.

Appendix

School Door Barricades

Several styles of door barricades are available and are relatively inexpensive. Schools can direct purchase these items and install them themselves. These offer a great improvement in the denial of entry against an intruder, are easily operated, and are inexpensive.

Active Shooter Response (Electronic notification system) - ASR

Assessment Completed by:

Author: D. Hunt

Chief Darryl C. Hunt

dhunt@woccisd.net

West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Police Department

1400 Newton Street

Orange, Texas 77630

This report is intended solely for the use of West Orange -Cove CISD and should not be recreated or copied for use at facilities or sites other than the sites assessed in this document without prior written permission from West Orange -Cove Consolidated School District

This document is considered CONFIDENTIAL and should be safeguarded and the information contained within protected.

West Orange -Cove Consolidated Independent School District

Site Security and Threat Assessment

West Orange- Stark Middle School

Brodrick Mc Grew, Principal

1402 Green Ave

Orange, Texas 77630

Security Consultant: Darryl C. Hunt

Police Chief WOCCISD Police Department

April 27, 2020

Table of Contents

Introduction

The following information documents the Security and Threat Assessment conducted for the WOCCISD West Orange -Stark Middle School complex located at, 1402 Green Ave, Orange, Tx.77630, and was conducted on site on April 26, 2020

The West Orange -Stark Middle School complex consists of two main primary buildings, athletics gym, for middle school students the district has 412 employees and 521 students at this Middle School complex.

Author: D. Hunt

This document contains a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the current physical and operational conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. Recommendations are included for consideration to improve overall security and reduce risks to personnel, operations, and facilities through implementation of countermeasures and mitigating strategies to detect and deter threats.

The scope of the assessment is limited to the physical and operational security of the WOCCISD school campuses and does not include a "Multi-Hazards" approach addressing other risk conditions such as environmental, cyber, or economic risks. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate existing security conditions relative to the physical components of the facilities and the operational plans and protocols in place to respond to potential acts of violence.

Recommendation for mitigating identified risks is based on industry best practices, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Association of School Boards, and the Texas State University School Safety Center.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a set of design principles used to discourage crime and promote building security. CPTED principles are based on anticipating the thought processes of a potential offender and creating an environment that discourages follow-through. CPTED has the added advantage of creating a sense of security and well-being among employees and tenants.

CPTED follows four principles of design;

Natural Surveillance

Criminals do not like to be seen or recognized, so they will choose situations where they can hide and easily escape.

Natural Access Control

Criminals like to feel that they are in control. However, this sense of control can be denied by clearly marking the approaches to buildings and properties and channeling visitors into a defined area.

Territorial Reinforcement

The purpose of this principle is to create a clear distinction between public and private property. This is important for two reasons: Legitimate occupants have a sense of ownership and will notice, and even challenge, people who don't belong; intruders, on the other hand, have a harder time blending in.

Maintenance

Maintenance is related to territorial reinforcement. A well-maintained area sends the message that people notice and care about what happens in an area. This, in turn discourages vandalism and other crimes. Security practitioners refer to the "Broken Windows Theory," the idea that one broken window will entice vandals to break another. A vandalized area then becomes more inviting to higher levels of crime. A property should be well-maintained as a matter of safety as well as pride.

Target Hardening

Target hardening is another strategy often mentioned in connection with CPTED. This simply means making a building more difficult to forcibly enter.

WOCCISD- CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

CPTED Principle	Rating
Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Needs Improvement
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Needs Improvement
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Needs Improvement
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Needs Improvement
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

WOCCISD - CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Needs Improvement
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Needs Improvement
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Needs Improvement
Territorial Reinforcement	Good

Rating scheme

Excellent	Very high quality or standards for security and or safety.
Very Good	High quality or standards for security and or safety.
Good	Exceeds standards for security and or safety.
Average	Meets standards for security and or safety.
Needs Improvement	Does not meet standards for security and or safety
Deficient	Lacking standards and is inadequate for security and or safety.

Author: D. Hunt

Layers and Rings of Protection

Layers of protection represent procedural and physical countermeasures that protect assets. The following categories are associated with layers of protection designed to provide an acceptable level of security for personnel and the facility itself.

External

1.   Facility Complex Access Control (Gates, Signage, Guard, Traffic Routing, etc..)

2.   Building Access Control (Electronic badge access, mechanical locks, etc.)

3.   Video Surveillance system (cameras)

4.   Environmental Design (building compound arrangement)

5.   Maintenance and activity support

6.   Fencing and parking gates

7.   Signage

8.   Lighting

9.   Locked utilities

10.   Security Personnel Patrols

Internal

1.   Associate Badge System (electronic, physical ID's, other)

2.   Campus Police Officer

3.   Centralized access points and entrances

4.   Visitor check in and checkout procedures

5.   Associate hiring and screening procedures

6.   Secured internal layers of doors, locks and authorized areas

7.   Camera monitoring

8.   Door alarms

9.   Motion sensor devices

10.   Lighting

11.   High visibility and open work areas

12.   Locked entrances to electrical, utility, plant and maintenance areas

Author: D. Hunt

13.   Personnel accountability system

14.   Key controls

15.   Asset and inventory controls

16.   Interior maintenance and activity support

17.   Fire Suppression systems

18.   Alarm and alert systems

19.   Associate policies, procedures and training programs

20.   Communications systems (redundant)

21.   Emergency and crisis plan, procedures and controls

Potential Threats or Losses

These are a list of potential security threats that may impact safety and security of the facility and or personnel.

1.   Workplace violence

2.   External sabotage

3.   Internal sabotage

4.   Terrorist attack

5.   Systems or facility tampering

6.   Theft

7.   Robbery

8.   Assault

9.   Explosion

10.   Abduction

11.   Arson

12.   Vandalism

Physical Security

 A review of the physical security conditions at the West Orange – Stark Middle School complex addressed the facility environment from an "outside – in" approach. This considers the facility

geographic layout relative to the design's ability to mitigate potential security risks from the outside, and migrates to the specific physical and procedural security mechanisms on site designed to protect personnel and assets.

The West Orange Stark Middle School overall physical security assessment is" Below Average"

External Physical Security:

5. Findings: The West Orange -Stark High School complex is unique in school designs the upstairs are only covers 1/3 of the building on the top floor with eight class rooms "security positive", adequate security measures have not been taken to capitalize on the design. Access to the property by both vehicular and foot traffic is uninhibited and easily obtained on all sides of the property. Numerous roadways and unfenced wooded areas allow for open access. No access gates, fencing, guards, or signage exists to deter unauthorized entry or to channel persons to a centralized reception area. The open and uncontrolled access creates a significant security risk allowing a person or persons to enter the property unchallenged and have direct access to all areas of the school. In addition to the open access onto the property, the buildings themselves at several locations are unlocked during school hours which will be addressed later in this document.
6.   Video surveillance cameras were observed around several of the buildings and provided more than ample coverage of the perimeter areas; however, coverage was limited or nonexistent for road access points of the perimeter areas. At the time of the assessment, all of the campus cameras are functioning...

Recommendations:

- •   Install gates or gate arms at all points of roadway access onto the property. Identify a single-entry point and create a channelized traffic flow directing vehicles to the appropriate parking areas. This can be completed through a variety of means, each with varying degrees of effectiveness such as, parking lot redesign, physical barriers, barrels/cones, painted lines, and signage
- •   Designate visitor parking area and install adequate signage directing persons where to park and where to enter the building
- •   Consider erecting security fencing around the buildings to reduce access to the areas of highest concern – where the students are most of the time, If financially feasible, erect fencing with signage around entire property
- •   Additional external cameras are needed to provide full visibility of driveways, property perimeters, and all sides of existing buildings. (The camera system itself will be addressed separately)

Author: D. Hunt

- Parking should be monitored and enforced. Consider windshield parking stickers or hangars with designation of role, i.e., student, faculty, contractor, etc.

Access Control (Listed as the number 1 security recommendation by the TEA for the 2019 school year)

6.1. Findings: No formal access control exists for the property or buildings. Check in procedures for visitors were on an honor system but not actively enforced. The size of the community allowed for familiarity with most persons entering the property which lends itself to a false sense of security.
In many past school violence incidents, the perpetrators were either students or former students and recognized by those on the property. Familiarity does not equate to authorized presence.

6.2. Recommendations: Access control needs to be assessed based on the level of acceptable risk and level of security desired. Despite the age of the buildings and the multiple variations in doors and locks, several options exist to enhance the access control deficiencies.

An electronic access control badge system has been installed to provide a high level of monitored and vetted access for all persons and ensures the area of building is covered by the system should be maintained in a secure mode. It has an inherent weakness from the human element from people holding doors but our current systems are not alarmed to notify when a door has been left open. The system should be monitored by security personnel.

West Orange -Stark High School would benefit from an on-site event monitoring system and personnel, an access control process that is both procedural and electronic makes the most sense. In adopting a layered approach in developing a security program, the philosophy follows that the site creates layers of barriers designed to deter, detect, and respond to possible threats. Access Control is but one of those layers and when coupled with the previously mentioned property access remedies, adds that additional layer in preventing further and deeper access into the facility.

- It is recommended a single point of entry be established for all visitors, to include parents, former students, contractors, etc., and clear and visible signage be posted directing persons to that area.

- Visitors should present valid ID and have a verified reason as well as a specific person they are meeting prior to being issued a visitors' badge. The badge should list location authorized to be visited

- All visitors should be escorted by an employee or student office aid if possible.

Author: D. Hunt

An electronic visitor tracking system should be employed for establishing and maintaining a database of visitors. A standardized Regional system could maintain a centralized database of visitors and provide alerts for persons who could pose a risk. Such a system when employed on a common network ties all school facilities together to identify visitors, reduce costs of purchasing, and general maintenance of the system

Video Management System (VMS) – *Security cameras*

7. **Findings:** West Orange Stark-Middle School is equipped with 193 cameras operating on a Video Insight software system installed August 2019. Cameras are mounted both internally and externally of new cameras on the same network. Coverage by external cameras does adequately cover all buildings and parking lot that has public access areas onto the property. No perimeter coverage exists for the rear or the north side of the CTE complex, to include the Tennis court area.

   e. Camera quality is more than adequate during daytime and nighttime viewing (Good quality during low light) Installation of the cameras was of good quality.
   f. Administration of the system is sufficient (The inhouse IT team has adequate training or administrative rights to the system)
   g. It was unknown if original camera IP addresses were changed which can present vulnerabilities to the system
   h. Its also unknown if the district IT professional has inspected the Video software system for risks to the school network.

3.1.   **Recommendations:** Video systems are for the most part a reactionary tool used for conducting investigations or obtaining information after an event. Few organizations conduct active monitoring of video systems and for this reason it is imperative the recording times for all cameras should have at least a 30-day storage period. The cameras themselves provide some level of deterrence since they are highly visible around the complex.

• Additional external cameras should be installed to ensure coverage on all sides of all buildings. Rather than continue with the same quality, style, and manufacturer camera units, consider using 270-degree cameras on building corners to provide full coverage along two sides of the building, thus leading to fewer cameras being installed.

• Require security vendor to provide documented formulas for how a particular camera type was selected to ensure the view meets the required quality (pixels on target). There is a mathematical formula for determining camera specifications to meet the requirements for each location. This ensures the right camera is used in each setting and is based on the area of coverage needed and the quality of picture obtained.

- Identify the recorded frame rate for each camera and ensure the recorded sample provides adequate quality (too low of a frame rate leads to choppy or unclear video with loss of activity coverage and too fast of a frame rate may eat up too much storage space for no reason)

- Conduct research on camera types and prices rather than being told what camera will be installed and what the cost is going to be (use competitive bids when possible)Establish procedures for conducting regular reviews of camera recordings and to verify functionality of the system. A common practice is to scroll through "critical" camera views each morning at an accelerated speed to identify any suspicious activity. This makes you aware of things you would otherwise have no idea had occurred, and shows which cameras are functioning properly.

- Ensure a district IT employee is trained to troubleshoot the video software and inspect network appliances to ensure serviceability. If this is not available, engage the security company to discuss a maintenance agreement or establish service call criteria and priorities.

- Recommend the district and/or region adopt a standardized video management system that can be interconnected on one network. This improves functionality, maintenance, familiarity with the operations, and ensures best pricing. Avoid using residential quality systems to save money – commercial quality exists for a reason and will last long enough to see a return on the investment.

Internal Physical Security:

Findings: In keeping with the layered approach of creating multiple security barriers, the physical aspects inside the buildings play a significant role in enhancing overall safety and security. Building on enhancements from exterior areas which are recommended to begin at the property perimeter boundaries, we have developed methods to deny and deter unwanted entry at the furthest points from personnel and assets as well as methods of early identification.

Each layer offers an opportunity to identify and interdict a threat before an adverse action is initiated and the enhancement of physical security inside the buildings creates additional layers on top of the external measures.

The following internal security findings were observed:

a. A functioning fire alarm system throughout the complex. Fire pull stations were in all buildings were functional. Fire extinguishers were not in an enclosed case, the sprinkler systems are installed in the buildings. It should be noted the auditors were advised the school passed all inspections.

Author: D. Hunt

b. The physical structure of doors and locks in all buildings were observed to be in good condition and in working order

c. Emergency exit doors were equipped with proper push bars and were locked

d. All classroom doors were able to be inspected and could be locked from the inside.

4.1 Recommendations: Overall the internal physical security structure of the site is Good. Lighting is good throughout the buildings and each building is equipped with adequate avenues for egress.

 Recommendations for improving the overall internal security conditions as part of the layered security approach are more procedural than physical and will be addressed as a separate category. Physical enhancements are as follows:

• All classrooms should be equipped with a device that allows the door to be locked and prevent a forced entry. The school's "Lockdown – Lockout" procedures, teachers and staff should have the ability to create a safe "shelter in place" environment that denies entry to an intruder or other threat. Locking devices should be secured and in the control of a teacher or staff to prevent the unauthorized locking of a door

• For doors with glass panels, a drop-down window covering is recommended to prevent viewing into the room from outside in the event of a lockdown

• The ability to exit each room through a window should be considered when available. If windows do not open, a glass breakage device should be available

• Panic alarm activation buttons are installed at critical points throughout the school and at a minimum be installed in the main office, and the nurse's station and attendance causing a blue light to flash in the hallways.

Policies and Procedures

8. A critical part of any organization's security program are the documented emergency action plans, procedures, and policies designed to provide guidance and clarity to personnel so they can effectively manage events. Developing emergency action plans is most effective when the plans and procedures are part of a comprehensive Crisis Management Program which gives structure and support to the implantation of those plans and procedures.
     Under the Texas Unified School Safety and Security Standards issued by Texas State University, the development of a multi-hazard preparedness plan consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a requirement as listed in the Texas Education Code, 37.108, as well as being recommended in various FEMA guidance documents.

Although a Crisis Management Program is an all-hazards response program that extends beyond security related events, it is still a critical function for school security activities and plans an integral function in effectively planning for and responding to events.

Regardless of what the documents or procedures are named, it is important to develop plans and procedures to address how emergency events will be managed, who performs what tasks, who is in charge, etc. An emergency response plan can address the all-hazards issue and provide specific guidance through the different events, but this plan needs to be written and formally adopted by the organization. All personnel should be trained and held responsible for compliance with these plans. Whether there is one or multiple plans, areas that must be addressed are:

•Site Security – Assigning a responsible person to oversee the security program, update assessments, and ensure all security needs are addressed. Tasks can be delegated across multiple areas and persons but one person needs to own the program and ensure the tasks are completed and the security procedures are adhered to.

•Emergency Response – How the organization responds to a variety of events, from environmental events, to human hazard events. How does the organization prepare in advance to mitigate impact, how and who is managing the event while it is active, and how does the organization recover following an event. All of these things need to be considered and planned for as part of the Crisis Management Program.
  Such a program can be isolated within the district or part of a larger organizational support structure but it needs to be in place.

•Safety Plans/ Medical / Pandemic Plans
•MOU's – Does the organization have any MOU's with other agencies (government, NGO's, etc.). These plans should be included as part of the overall operational plans.

District Safety and Security Committee

• The Texas Education Code (Sec 37.109) suggest the formation of a safety and security committee as well as developing processes to identify and appropriately assist individuals who exhibit signs of violent, harmful, or risky behavior, and/or pose a threat of committing criminal activity.

• These initiatives highlight the need for a monitoring group to track information and monitor social media for information that would allow early interdiction into undesirable behavior that could escalate into violent action.

• The establishment of an online reporting site and/or call in number for people to report suspicious or unusual behavior or general concerns that can be followed up on is recommended. Early identification and intervention are crucial to preventing acts of violence

Author: D. Hunt

. <u>**Critical Security Event Assessment – Active Shooter Events**</u>

Active Shooter events are a major concern for all schools and no area of the country is exempt from these occurrences. Rural areas are no less susceptible than urban areas when it comes to this type of violent event. Several factors predicate the outcome should such an event occur. It should be noted that few facilities are 100% secure or inaccessible to a determined intruder so the actions taken when an event occurs will determine the outcome for the most part. Advance warning of the threat, the ability to deny access, and the ability to positively interdict the threat are of the utmost importance in reducing the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. A comprehensive action plan must be developed, trained, and practiced in order to create an effective program and deterrent to such events.

Several steps to consider in establishing such a program are:

• Adopt an Active Shooter Awareness Training Program. Numerous programs currently exist and are available for use at no cost. Each has its own response perspective and selection should be based on the environment and culture of each organization. Examples of these are the, "Run, Hide, Fight" and "Avoid, Deny, Defend" programs. At a minimum, all staff should be given this awareness training and if acceptable, students should also be exposed to some or all of the training points.

• Operational Response Plans Developed – as part of the emergency response plans for the organization, clear response plans should be developed and practiced. These plans include notification methods (how the threat is communicated to everyone), lockdown or lockout procedures, shelter in place, creating safe areas, evacuation procedures, etc…

• Communication procedures in response to an active shooter can range from an audible alarm, PA system, emails, texts, bullhorns, and a variety of other methods. Careful consideration should be taken as to the most effective method that will get the message out without compromising the response plan to the intruder. *Cellular programs such as "WhatsApp" and "Signal" are good communication programs that can use group messaging to push messages out in a two-way communication. This can be more effective and reliable than hand held radios.*

• One major problem with an active shooter is identifying where he is, where he is moving to, and how to let everyone know so they can take effective evasive action. A recommendation from this auditor is to consider the electronic notification system for Active Shooter events known as, "ASR" or Active Shooter Response. This is an activation station similar to a fire pull station that when activated sends texts and emails to everyone in the system, to include emergency response personnel. The benefit of this type of system is the location of the shooter is identified by the activation station and each new activation identifies movement and a new location. Since response time to interdict an active shooter is critical, this immediate notification speeds up that notification process while at the same time allowing persons at the site to make informed decisions about movement away from the threat.

Author: D. Hunt

• As a follow on to the previous recommendation, past events have shown that most school shooting events end as soon as the shooter is confronted by an armed response. As such, the ability to interdict the action by inserting an armed responder is the most decisive action that can be taken to end the event. The previous recommendations throughout this assessment are all designed to create layers of security to "harden" the target by creating concentric rings of physical barriers to impede movement throughout the facility. Adding in robust response plans provides the proactive measure of moving people away from the threat

Together these actions constitute the organization's critical event response program or emergency response plan which is a critical part of effectively managing a violent action. A detailed description and recommendation for the ARMED response capability within the West Orange-Stark High School is as follows:

Armed Programs and Recommendations West Orange-Cove CISD

The State of Texas allows for the armed protection of our schools and has set forth the standards and requirements for the approved programs. It should be made very clear that the carrying of a firearm on school property is closely regulated in the State of Texas and the laws should be fully understood and complied with.

 The State of Texas authorizes security responses under the authority of the Texas Education Code, Texas Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedures. Any action taken by West Orange-Cove CISD with regard to the adoption of one of the state's approved programs should be fully reviewed by the district's legal department and guidance issued by that department should be followed. The district assumes great liability in adopting and implementing an armed response program and should give careful consideration to the type of program being adopted, the level of training and support the district is willing to provide, existing response assets, and all mitigation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of an event.

 The state of Texas offers several options to schools to provide armed protection and response. Each program has rules and regulations that must be complied with

See attached program information and link;(School Marshals and other District personnel Carrying Firearms).

• **School Marshall Program**

a.   Allows for one Marshall per site with 200 students in daily attendance

b.   Appointment of the Marshall is made by the Board of Trustees

c.   Requires specific law enforcement licensing and training

d.   Plainclothes position(armed) unless position as part of regular duties in direct contact with students – in this case the weapon must be locked up

e.   Requires use of specific ammunition (frangible)

- **School Resource Officer (SRO) – Active Law Enforcement Officer**

a.   District may hire an on or off-duty law enforcement officer

b.   Officer in uniform

c.   May be a shared resource with other schools

- **Guardian Program – Armed School Safety Employee**

b.   District grants written permission to carry a firearm on campus

c.   Carries firearm not pursuant to a handgun license but by written authority under Section 46.03, Tx Att'y Gen Op No GA-1051.

d.   School is mandated to coordinate with local law enforcement when having armed employees at the school (Tx Ed Code 37.108(a((3)

e.   Additional training through state certified programs is recommended

f.   School District assumes full liability for the armed employee's actions

- **Private Security – Uniformed and armed security guard**

   b.   District may hire a licensed private security company to provide a uniformed, armed guard to patrol campus

Armed Personnel and Program Discussion

The decision to consider having an armed presence at the school is a matter taken very seriously. A tremendous amount of liability comes with each program as well as with the decision to not use any of them. There are inherent flaws and risks with each program so they need to be carefully examined to determine which if any is appropriate for a given environment. Some items to consider in this discussion are:

a. Response time of local law enforcement
b. Capability of local law enforcement
c. School funding for program
d. Availability of qualified armed personnel (private or employee)
e. Emotional climate (parents, board members, general public, law enforcement)

In dissecting each program, there are positives and negatives to each which will be given a cursory discussion here;

School Marshall Program – This program brings a state certified peace officer with specific law enforcement training to the campus. The district hires this person so they have the opportunity to interview and assess the person. This is a plainclothes position and the Marshall is an employee of the district. They may carry a concealed firearm unless they have a dual role that brings them in direct contact with students, in which case they must lock their firearm up and it must be in close proximity to them at all times. The district incurs the cost of the Marshall as an added head count since they are employees. Those costs will include benefits in addition to salary which can drive the cost of the program beyond many district's funding ability.

District Police Department or School Resource Officer (SRO) – This program allows a district to enter into an MOU with a local law enforcement agency to hire officers to work in uniform either full or part time. Since a uniformed officer is a strong deterrent to a violent offender, this program offers great benefit in that the officer is not an employee, their actions are covered by their agency, as well as any injuries incurred while enforcing the law, and they present that key feature that an official presence can confront a perpetrator. Being uniformed and armed, employed by a government agency, not an added head count or subject to benefit packages, and trained to perform the function they are being hired to do makes this a highly desirable option.

Guardian Program – The school district selects an employee and authorizes them to be armed on school property. The district assumes full liability for the actions of this employee and may even pay an extra stipend for the person to perform this task. The state has a two day certification training program and requires the candidate to have a concealed handgun license in the State of Texas. One of several issues with this program is selecting and training an individual to enter a violent event with a firearm in order to act to end the aggression.

This is a difficult task with professionally trained law enforcement personnel, let alone someone who has not encountered that type of environment. Added to this is the requirement that firearms proficiency for this environment far exceeds most police firearms training courses since there is a high probability of striking another person when shooting inside a school.

 Active Shooter events are dynamic, high stress events that require professional interdiction with no hesitation. That level of competence is difficult at best to obtain from the majority of available personnel for this program and should be considered as the last resort to an armed response, or possibly as a supplement to another program.

One operational positive to this program would be to implement it as a defensive action whereby the armed employee defended a room rather than aggressing against a perpetrator. Designated safe rooms could be defended by several armed employees who used the firearm as a last defense rather than exceeding their skill level or capability by moving directly to the threat.

Summary

Author: D. Hunt

In essence the overall security environment for the West Orange Cove CISD is rated as FAIR. The lack of historical events and a favorable social environment for the area helps support a relatively safe environment compared to many other areas. This environment has also fostered a lack of urgency to identify and correct some of the issues identified in this assessment and the congenial relationships harbor a false sense of security and safety.

In the security profession, Hope is not considered a strategy and as history has shown, active shooter events occur in environments similar to this one so it is incumbent on the district to make improvements, develop plans of action, provide training to personnel, engage the district police and local law enforcement to discuss response strategies, and engage the school board to develop a unified strategy.

Remaining cognizant of limited and competing resources, a prioritized list of actions should be developed. Items providing the best return in terms of enhanced security in relation to overall cost should be implemented first keeping in mind that many of the suggested remedies may be the lowest expenditures or may be procedural in nature.

Armed with a list of needed improvements, projected implementation and budget proposals can be developed. Not all items and deficiencies can be corrected immediately but a roadmap for taking positive action to enhance the overall security conditions can be developed and planned for.

Program Support:

A Security and Threat Assessment is a good start at evaluating risks and vulnerabilities; however, without supporting an organization through these improvements, it has little value. As a follow up to this initial assessment, The WOCCISD Police Department is prepared to support our district in developing emergency response plans and procedures, training personnel, assisting in managing table top exercises, and providing expert training should the district decide to pursue any above listed program on our campus (es).

Threat Assessments are site specific and even though they tend to have similarities in the areas being assessed, are still very individualistic with different variables. For most organizations, having individual assessments contracted can be cost prohibitive and, must be revisited periodically for they are not sustainable for a long-term program.

Assessments have a shelf life and should be reevaluated annually at a minimum. Performing these assessments requires specific training but that does not mean a school district cannot perform their own; it just requires them to be trained.

One approach is to offer a Train the Trainer (T3) Program to instruct selected district employees to conduct the assessments and follow through the process to include recommendations and action plans. Training a select group to perform this task guarantees the district can, over a long period, perform this valuable function and comply with state mandates that continue to develop in this arena. This approach offers considerable cost savings to the district versus contracting services for each site. The program and training can be made available should this be seen as a viable option.

Author: D. Hunt

Appendix

School Door Barricades

Several styles of door barricades are available and are relatively inexpensive. Schools can direct purchase these items and install them themselves. These offer a great improvement in the denial of entry against an intruder, are easily operated, and are inexpensive.

Active Shooter Response (Electronic notification system) - ASR

Assessment Completed by:

Author: D. Hunt

Chief Darryl C. Hunt

dhunt@woccisd.net

West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Police Department

1400 Newton Street

Orange, Texas 77630

Author: D. Hunt

West Orange -Cove Consolidated Independent School District

Site Security and Threat Assessment

West Orange-Stark Elementary School

Dr. Troy Bethley, Principal

2605 Martin Luther King

Orange, Texas 77630

Security Consultant: Darryl C. Hunt

Police Chief WOCCISD Police Department

April 28, 2020

Table of Contents

Introduction

The following information documents the Security and Threat Assessment conducted for the West Orange-Stark Elementary School located at, 2605 Martin Luther King, Orange, Tx.77630, and was conducted on site on April 28 2020

The West Orange-Stark Elementary School is an elementary school in Orange, TX, in the West Orange-Cove CISD school district. it has 1,059 students. K-5 students were enrolled in bilingual and English language learning programs. The school is in the jurisdiction of the City of Pinehurst Texas. The building is accessible through the following areas: it consist of seven classroom

Author: D. Hunt

hallways with exit doors at each end (Doors are secure from the inside but can be propped open without alarming any staff, the gym and cafeteria have glass doors with no alarm.

This document contains a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the current physical and operational conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. Recommendations are included for consideration to improve overall security and reduce risks to personnel, operations, and facilities through implementation of countermeasures and mitigating strategies to detect and deter threats.

The scope of the assessment is limited to the physical and operational security of the WOCCISD school campuses and does not include a "Multi-Hazards" approach addressing other risk conditions such as environmental, cyber, or economic risks. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate existing security conditions relative to the physical components of the facilities and the operational plans and protocols in place to respond to potential acts of violence.

 Recommendation for mitigating identified risks is based on industry best practices, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Association of School Boards, and the Texas State University School Safety Center.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a set of design principles used to discourage crime and promote building security. CPTED principles are based on anticipating the thought processes of a potential offender and creating an environment that discourages follow-through. CPTED has the added advantage of creating a sense of security and well-being among employees and tenants.

CPTED follows four principles of design;

Natural Surveillance

Criminals do not like to be seen or recognized, so they will choose situations where they can hide and easily escape.

Natural Access Control

Criminals like to feel that they are in control. However, this sense of control can be denied by clearly marking the approaches to buildings and properties and channeling visitors into a defined area.

Territorial Reinforcement

The purpose of this principle is to create a clear distinction between public and private property. This is important for two reasons: Legitimate occupants have a sense of ownership and will notice, and even challenge, people who don't belong; intruders, on the other hand, have a harder time blending in.

Maintenance

Maintenance is related to territorial reinforcement. A well-maintained area sends the message that people notice and care about what happens in an area. This, in turn discourages vandalism and other crimes. Security practitioners refer to the "Broken Windows Theory," the idea that one broken window will entice vandals to break another. A vandalized area then becomes more inviting to higher levels of crime. A property should be well-maintained as a matter of safety as well as pride.

Target Hardening

Target hardening is another strategy often mentioned in connection with CPTED. This simply means making a building more difficult to forcibly enter.

WOCCISD- CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

CPTED Principle	Rating
Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Good
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Very Good
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

Author: D. Hunt

WOCCISD - CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Average
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Good
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Good
Sidewalks and walkways	Good
Doors	Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

Rating scheme

Excellent	Very high quality or standards for security and or safety.
Very Good	High quality or standards for security and or safety.
Good	Exceeds standards for security and or safety.
Average	Meets standards for security and or safety.
Needs Improvement	Does not meet standards for security and or safety
Deficient	Lacking standards and is inadequate for security and or safety.

Author: D. Hunt

Layers and Rings of Protection

Layers of protection represent procedural and physical countermeasures that protect assets. The following categories are associated with layers of protection designed to provide an acceptable level of security for personnel and the facility itself.

External

1. Facility Complex Access Control (Gates, Signage, Guard, Traffic Routing, etc..)

2. Building Access Control (Electronic badge access, mechanical locks, etc.)

3. Video Surveillance system (cameras)

4. Environmental Design (building compound arrangement)

5. Maintenance and activity support

6. Fencing and parking gates

7. Signage

8. Lighting

9. Locked utilities

10. Security Personnel Patrols

Internal

1. Associate Badge System (electronic, physical ID's, other)

2. Campus Police Officer

3. Centralized access points and entrances

4. Visitor check in and checkout procedures

5. Associate hiring and screening procedures

6. Secured internal layers of doors, locks and authorized areas

7. Camera monitoring

8. Door alarms

9. Motion sensor devices

10. Lighting

Author: D. Hunt

11. High visibility and open work areas

12. Locked entrances to electrical, utility, plant and maintenance areas

13. Personnel accountability system

14. Key controls

15. Asset and inventory controls

16. Interior maintenance and activity support

17. Fire Suppression systems

18. Alarm and alert systems

19. Associate policies, procedures and training programs

20. Communications systems (redundant)

21. Emergency and crisis plan, procedures and controls

Potential Threats or Losses

These are a list of potential security threats that may impact safety and security of the facility and or personnel.

1. Workplace violence

2. External sabotage

3. Internal sabotage

4. Terrorist attack

5. Systems or facility tampering

6. Theft

7. Robbery

8. Assault

9. Explosion

10. Abduction

11. Arson

12. Vandalism

Physical Security

 A review of the physical security conditions at the West Orange – Cove Consolidated Independent School District Elementary School addressed the facility environment from an "outside – in" approach. This considers the facility geographic layout relative to the design's ability to mitigate potential security risks from the outside, and migrates to the specific physical and procedural security mechanisms on site designed to protect personnel and assets.

The West Orange -Cove CISD Elementary School overall physical security assessment is "AVERAGE"

External Physical Security:

9. Findings: The WOCCISD Elementary School Access to the property by both vehicular and foot traffic is uninhibited and easily obtained only from the front of the building for visitors and employees' access.
10. Access gates, fencing, or signage exists to deter unauthorized entry or to channel persons to a centralized reception area.
11. The open and uncontrolled access does not create a significant security risk a person or persons entering the building are challenged by a receptionist and do not have direct access to any areas of the building, and are not allowed to walk around un-escorted
12. Video surveillance cameras were observed around several of the buildings and provided more than ample coverage of the perimeter areas. At the time of the assessment, all of the building cameras are functioning...

Recommendations:

.

- Designate visitor parking area and install adequate signage directing persons where to park. Reconfigure the parking lot to adequately support bus pick up traffic and parent pick—up, at the time of this assessment the issue appears very chaotic.
- Additional external cameras are needed to provide full visibility of driveways, property perimeters, and all sides.

.

Author: D. Hunt

An electronic access control badge system has been installed to provide a high level of monitored and vetted access for all persons and ensures the area of building is covered by the system should be maintained in a secure mode. It has an inherent weakness from the human element from people holding doors but our current systems are not alarmed to notify when a door has been left open. The system should be monitored by security personnel.

• It is recommended a single point of entry be established for all visitors, to include parents, former students, contractors, etc., and clear and visible signage be posted directing persons to that area.

• Visitors should present valid ID and have a verified reason as well as a specific person they are meeting prior to being issued a visitors' badge. The badge should list location authorized to be visited

• All visitors should be escorted by an employee if possible.

An electronic visitor tracking system should be employed for establishing and maintaining a database of visitors. A standardized Regional system could maintain a centralized database of visitors and provide alerts for persons who could pose a risk. Such a system when employed on a common network ties all school facilities together to identify visitors, reduce costs of purchasing, and general maintenance of the system

<u>Video Management System (VMS) – *Security cameras*</u>

13. **Findings:** WOCCISD Administration Complex is equipped with cameras operating on a Video Insight software system installed August 2019. Cameras are mounted both internally and externally of new cameras on the same network. Coverage by external cameras does adequately cover all buildings and parking lot that has public access areas onto the property. No perimeter coverage exists for the rear or the north side of the building.

i. Camera quality is more than adequate during daytime and nighttime viewing (Good quality during low light) Installation of the cameras was of good quality.
j. Administration of the system is sufficient (The inhouse IT team has adequate training or administrative rights to the system)
k. It was unknown if original camera IP addresses were changed which can present vulnerabilities to the system
l. Its also unknown if the district IT professional has inspected the Video software system for risks to the school network.

3.1. **Recommendations:** Video systems are for the most part a reactionary tool used for conducting investigations or obtaining information after an event. Few organizations conduct active monitoring of video systems and for this reason it is imperative the recording times for all cameras should have at least a 30-day storage period. The cameras

themselves provide some level of deterrence since they are highly visible around the complex.

- Additional external cameras should be installed to ensure coverage on all sides of all buildings. Rather than continue with the same quality, style, and manufacturer camera units, consider using 270-degree cameras on building corners to provide full coverage along two sides of the building, thus leading to fewer cameras being installed.

- Require security vendor to provide documented formulas for how a particular camera type was selected to ensure the view meets the required quality (pixels on target). There is a mathematical formula for determining camera specifications to meet the requirements for each location. This ensures the right camera is used in each setting and is based on the area of coverage needed and the quality of picture obtained.

- Identify the recorded frame rate for each camera and ensure the recorded sample provides adequate quality (too low of a frame rate leads to choppy or unclear video with loss of activity coverage and too fast of a frame rate may eat up too much storage space for no reason)

- Conduct research on camera types and prices rather than being told what camera will be installed and what the cost is going to be (use competitive bids when possible) Establish procedures for conducting regular reviews of camera recordings and to verify functionality of the system. A common practice is to scroll through "critical" camera views each morning at an accelerated speed to identify any suspicious activity. This makes you aware of things you would otherwise have no idea had occurred, and shows which cameras are functioning properly.

- Ensure a district IT employee is trained to troubleshoot the video software and inspect network appliances to ensure serviceability. If this is not available, engage the security company to discuss a maintenance agreement or establish service call criteria and priorities.

- Recommend the district and/or region adopt a standardized video management system that can be interconnected on one network. This improves functionality, maintenance, familiarity with the operations, and ensures best pricing. Avoid using residential quality systems to save money – commercial quality exists for a reason and will last long enough to see a return on the investment.

Internal Physical Security:

Findings: In keeping with the layered approach of creating multiple security barriers, the physical aspects inside the buildings play a significant role in enhancing overall safety and security. Building on enhancements from exterior areas which are recommended to begin at the

property perimeter boundaries, we have developed methods to deny and deter unwanted entry at the furthest points from personnel and assets as well as methods of early identification.

Each layer offers an opportunity to identify and interdict a threat before an adverse action is initiated and the enhancement of physical security inside the buildings creates additional layers on top of the external measures.

The following internal security findings were observed:

a. A functioning fire alarm system throughout the complex. Fire pull stations were in all buildings were functional. Fire extinguishers were in an enclosed case, the sprinkler systems are installed in the buildings. It should be noted the auditors were advised the school passed all inspections.

b. The physical structure of doors and locks in all buildings were observed to be in good condition and in working order

c. Emergency exit doors were equipped with proper push bars and were locked

4.1 Recommendations: Overall the internal physical security structure of the site is Good. Lighting is good throughout the buildings and each building is equipped with adequate avenues for egress.

Recommendations for improving the overall internal security conditions as part of the layered security approach are more procedural than physical and will be addressed as a separate category. Physical enhancements are as follows:

• For doors with glass panels, a drop-down window covering is recommended to prevent viewing into the room from outside in the event of a lockdown

• The ability to exit each room through a window should be considered when available. If windows do not open, a glass breakage device should be available

• Panic alarm activation buttons are installed at critical points throughout the school and at a minimum be installed in the main office, and the nurse's station and attendance causing a blue light to flash in the hallways.

Policies and Procedures

14. A critical part of any organization's security program are the documented emergency action plans, procedures, and policies designed to provide guidance and clarity to personnel so they can effectively manage events. Developing emergency action plans is most effective when the plans and procedures are part of a comprehensive Crisis

Management Program which gives structure and support to the implantation of those plans and procedures.

Under the Texas Unified School Safety and Security Standards issued by Texas State University, the development of a multi-hazard preparedness plan consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a requirement as listed in the Texas Education Code, 37.108, as well as being recommended in various FEMA guidance documents.

Although a Crisis Management Program is an all-hazards response program that extends beyond security related events, it is still a critical function for school security activities and plans an integral function in effectively planning for and responding to events.

Regardless of what the documents or procedures are named, it is important to develop plans and procedures to address how emergency events will be managed, who performs what tasks, who is in charge, etc. An emergency response plan can address the all-hazards issue and provide specific guidance through the different events, but this plan needs to be written and formally adopted by the organization. All personnel should be trained and held responsible for compliance with these plans. Whether there is one or multiple plans, areas that must be addressed are:

•Site Security – Assigning a responsible person to oversee the security program, update assessments, and ensure all security needs are addressed. Tasks can be delegated across multiple areas and persons but one person needs to own the program and ensure the tasks are completed and the security procedures are adhered to.

•Emergency Response – How the organization responds to a variety of events, from environmental events, to human hazard events. How does the organization prepare in advance to mitigate impact, how and who is managing the event while it is active, and how does the organization recover following an event? All of these things need to be considered and planned for as part of the Crisis Management Program.

Such a program can be isolated within the district or part of a larger organizational support structure but it needs to be in place.

•Safety Plans/ Medical / Pandemic Plans
•MOU's – Does the organization have any MOU's with other agencies (government, NGO's, etc.). These plans should be included as part of the overall operational plans.

District Safety and Security Committee

• The Texas Education Code (Sec 37.109) suggest the formation of a safety and security committee as well as developing processes to identify and appropriately assist individuals who exhibit signs of violent, harmful, or risky behavior, and/or pose a threat of committing criminal activity.

• These initiatives highlight the need for a monitoring group to track information and monitor social media for information that would allow early interdiction into undesirable behavior that could escalate into violent action.

• The establishment of an online reporting site and/or call in number for people to report suspicious or unusual behavior or general concerns that can be followed up on is recommended. Early identification and intervention are crucial to preventing acts of violence

.   <u>**Critical Security Event Assessment – Active Shooter Events**</u>

Active Shooter events are a major concern for all schools and no area of the country is exempt from these occurrences. Rural areas are no less susceptible than urban areas when it comes to this type of violent event. Several factors predicate the outcome should such an event occur. It should be noted that few facilities are 100% secure or inaccessible to a determined intruder so the actions taken when an event occurs will determine the outcome for the most part. Advance warning of the threat, the ability to deny access, and the ability to positively interdict the threat are of the utmost importance in reducing the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. A comprehensive action plan must be developed, trained, and practiced in order to create an effective program and deterrent to such events.

Several steps to consider in establishing such a program are:

• Adopt an Active Shooter Awareness Training Program. Numerous programs currently exist and are available for use at no cost. Each has its own response perspective and selection should be based on the environment and culture of each organization. Examples of these are the, "Run, Hide, Fight" and "Avoid, Deny, Defend" programs. At a minimum, all staff should be given this awareness training and if acceptable, students should also be exposed to some or all of the training points.

• Operational Response Plans Developed – as part of the emergency response plans for the organization, clear response plans should be developed and practiced. These plans include notification methods (how the threat is communicated to everyone), lockdown or lockout procedures, shelter in place, creating safe areas, evacuation procedures, etc…

• Communication procedures in response to an active shooter can range from an audible alarm, PA system, emails, texts, bullhorns, and a variety of other methods. Careful consideration should be taken as to the most effective method that will get the message out without compromising the response plan to the intruder. *Cellular programs such as "WhatsApp" and "Signal" are good communication programs that can use group messaging to push messages out in a two-way communication. This can be more effective and reliable than hand held radios.*

• One major problem with an active shooter is identifying where he is, where he is moving to, and how to let everyone know so they can take effective evasive action. A recommendation from this auditor is to consider the electronic notification system for Active Shooter events known as, "ASR" or Active Shooter Response. This is an activation station similar to a fire pull station that

Author: D. Hunt

when activated sends texts and emails to everyone in the system, to include emergency response personnel. The benefit of this type of system is the location of the shooter is identified by the activation station and each new activation identifies movement and a new location. Since response time to interdict an active shooter is critical, this immediate notification speeds up that notification process while at the same time allowing persons at the site to make informed decisions about movement away from the threat.

• As a follow on to the previous recommendation, past events have shown that most school shooting events end as soon as the shooter is confronted by an armed response. As such, the ability to interdict the action by inserting an armed responder is the most decisive action that can be taken to end the event. The previous recommendations throughout this assessment are all designed to create layers of security to "harden" the target by creating concentric rings of physical barriers to impede movement throughout the facility. Adding in robust response plans provides the proactive measure of moving people away from the threat

Together these actions constitute the organization's critical event response program or emergency response plan which is a critical part of effectively managing a violent action. A detailed description and recommendation for the ARMED response capability within the West Orange-Stark High School is as follows:

Armed Programs and Recommendations West Orange-Cove CISD

The State of Texas allows for the armed protection of our schools and has set forth the standards and requirements for the approved programs. It should be made very clear that the carrying of a firearm on school property is closely regulated in the State of Texas and the laws should be fully understood and complied with.

 The State of Texas authorizes security responses under the authority of the Texas Education Code, Texas Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedures. Any action taken by West Orange-Cove CISD with regard to the adoption of one of the state's approved programs should be fully reviewed by the district's legal department and guidance issued by that department should be followed. The district assumes great liability in adopting and implementing an armed response program and should consider the type of program being adopted, the level of training and support the district is willing to provide, existing response assets, and all mitigation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of an event.

 The state of Texas offers several options to schools to provide armed protection and response. Each program has rules and regulations that must be complied with

See attached program information and link;(School Marshals and other District personnel Carrying Firearms).

• **School Marshall Program**

a. Allows for one Marshall per site with 200 students in daily attendance

b. Appointment of the Marshall is made by the Board of Trustees

Author: D. Hunt

c.   Requires specific law enforcement licensing and training

d.   Plainclothes position(armed) unless position as part of regular duties in direct contact with students – in this case the weapon must be locked up

e.   Requires use of specific ammunition (frangible)

- **School Resource Officer (SRO) – Active Law Enforcement Officer**

a.   District may hire an on or off-duty law enforcement officer

b.   Officer in uniform

c.   May be a shared resource with other schools

- **Guardian Program – Armed School Safety Employee**

b.   District grants written permission to carry a firearm on campus

c.   Carries firearm not pursuant to a handgun license but by written authority under Section 46.03, Tx Att'y Gen Op No GA-1051.

d.   School is mandated to coordinate with local law enforcement when having armed employees at the school (Tx Ed Code 37.108(a((3)

e.   Additional training through state certified programs is recommended

f.   School District assumes full liability for the armed employee's actions

- **Private Security – Uniformed and armed security guard**

   c.   District may hire a licensed private security company to provide a uniformed, armed guard to patrol campus

Armed Personnel and Program Discussion

The decision to consider having an armed presence at the school is a matter taken very seriously. A tremendous amount of liability comes with each program as well as with the decision to not use any of them. There are inherent flaws and risks with each program so they need to be carefully examined to determine which if any is appropriate for a given environment. Some items to consider in this discussion are:

a. Response time of local law enforcement
b. Capability of local law enforcement
c. School funding for program

Author: D. Hunt

       d.   Availability of qualified armed personnel (private or employee)

       e.   Emotional climate (parents, board members, general public, law enforcement)

In dissecting each program, there are positives and negatives to each which will be given a cursory discussion here;

School Marshall Program – This program brings a state certified peace officer with specific law enforcement training to the campus. The district hires this person so they have the opportunity to interview and assess the person. This is a plainclothes position and the Marshall is an employee of the district. They may carry a concealed firearm unless they have a dual role that brings them in direct contact with students, in which case they must lock their firearm up and it must be in close proximity to them at all times. The district incurs the cost of the Marshall as an added head count since they are employees. Those costs will include benefits in addition to salary which can drive the cost of the program beyond many district's funding ability.

District Police Department or School Resource Officer (SRO) – This program allows a district to enter into an MOU with a local law enforcement agency to hire officers to work in uniform either full or part time. Since a uniformed officer is a strong deterrent to a violent offender, this program offers great benefit in that the officer is not an employee, their actions are covered by their agency, as well as any injuries incurred while enforcing the law, and they present that key feature that an official presence can confront a perpetrator. Being uniformed and armed, employed by a government agency, not an added head count or subject to benefit packages, and trained to perform the function they are being hired to do makes this a highly desirable option.

Guardian Program – The school district selects an employee and authorizes them to be armed on school property. The district assumes full liability for the actions of this employee and may even pay an extra stipend for the person to perform this task. The state has a two day certification training program and requires the candidate to have a concealed handgun license in the State of Texas. One of several issues with this program is selecting and training an individual to enter a violent event with a firearm in order to act to end the aggression.

This is a difficult task with professionally trained law enforcement personnel, let alone someone who has not encountered that type of environment. Added to this is the requirement that firearms proficiency for this environment far exceeds most police firearms training courses since there is a high probability of striking another person when shooting inside a school.

Active Shooter events are dynamic, high stress events that require professional interdiction with no hesitation. That level of competence is difficult at best to obtain from the majority of available personnel for this program and should be considered as the last resort to an armed response, or possibly as a supplement to another program.

One operational positive to this program would be to implement it as a defensive action whereby the armed employee defended a room rather than aggressing against a perpetrator. Designated safe rooms could be defended by several armed employees who used the firearm as a last defense rather than exceeding their skill level or capability by moving directly to the threat.

Summary

In essence the overall security environment for the West Orange Cove CISD Elementary School is rated as AVERAGE The lack of historical events and a favorable social environment for the area helps support a relatively safe environment compared to many other areas. This environment has also fostered a lack of urgency to identify and correct some of the issues identified in this assessment and the congenial relationships harbor a false sense of security and safety.

In the security profession, Hope is not considered a strategy and as history has shown, active shooter events occur in environments similar to this one so it is incumbent on the district to make improvements, develop plans of action, provide training to personnel, engage the district police and local law enforcement to discuss response strategies, and engage the school board to develop a unified strategy.

Remaining cognizant of limited and competing resources, a prioritized list of actions should be developed. Items providing the best return in terms of enhanced security in relation to overall cost should be implemented first keeping in mind that many of the suggested remedies may be the lowest expenditures or may be procedural in nature.

  Armed with a list of needed improvements, projected implementation and budget proposals can be developed. Not all items and deficiencies can be corrected immediately but a roadmap for taking positive action to enhance the overall security conditions can be developed and planned for.

Program Support:

A Security and Threat Assessment is a good start at evaluating risks and vulnerabilities; however, without supporting an organization through these improvements, it has little value. As a follow up to this initial assessment, The WOCCISD Police Department is prepared to support our district in developing emergency response plans and procedures, training personnel, assisting in managing table top exercises, and providing expert training should the district decide to pursue any above listed program on our campus (es).

Threat Assessments are site specific and even though they tend to have similarities in the areas being assessed, are still very individualistic with different variables. For most organizations, having individual assessments contracted can be cost prohibitive and, must be revisited periodically for they are not sustainable for a long-term program.

 Assessments have a shelf life and should be reevaluated annually at a minimum. Performing these assessments requires specific training but that does not mean a school district cannot perform their own; it just requires them to be trained.

Author: D. Hunt

One approach is to offer a Train the Trainer (T3) Program to instruct selected district employees to conduct the assessments and follow through the process to include recommendations and action plans. Training a select group to perform this task guarantees the district can, over a long period, perform this valuable function and comply with state mandates that continue to develop in this arena. This approach offers considerable cost savings to the district versus contracting services for each site. The program and training can be made available should this be seen as a viable option.

Appendix

School Door Barricades

Several styles of door barricades are available and are relatively inexpensive. Schools can direct purchase these items and install them themselves. These offer a great improvement in the denial of entry against an intruder, are easily operated, and are inexpensive.

Active Shooter Response (Electronic notification system) - ASR

Assessment Completed by:

Chief Darryl C. Hunt

dhunt@woccisd.net

West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Police Department

1400 Newton Street

Orange, Texas 77630

Author: D. Hunt

West Orange -Cove Consolidated Independent School District
Site Security and Threat Assessment
West Orange-Stark North Early Learning Center
Vickie Price-Oceguera, Principal
801 Cordrey Street
Orange, Texas 77631

Security Consultant: Darryl C. Hunt
Police Chief WOCCISD Police Department
April 29, 2020

Table of Contents

Author: D. Hunt

Introduction

The following information documents the Security and Threat Assessment conducted for the West Orange-Stark North Early Learning Center located at, 801 Cordrey Street, Orange, Tx.77631, and was conducted on site on April 29,2020

The West Orange-Stark North Early Learning Center in Orange, Texas offers three pre-school programs to eligible youngsters. The Head Start and Pre-Kindergarten programs introduce four-year olds to the concepts of learning. Both programs are designed for children of low-income families. North Early Learning Center also offers Preschool Programs for children with disabilities. This program largely serves eligible three-year-old children and older who are referred by county and state agencies. Over 300 children are usually enrolled in North Early Learning Center programs during the school year.

 This document contains a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the current physical and operational conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. Recommendations are included for consideration to improve overall security and reduce risks to personnel, operations, and facilities through implementation of countermeasures and mitigating strategies to detect and deter threats. The scope of the assessment is limited to the physical and operational security of the WOCCISD school campuses and does not include a "Multi-Hazards" approach addressing other risk conditions such as environmental, cyber, or economic risks. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate existing security conditions relative to the physical components of the facilities and the operational plans and protocols in place to respond to potential acts of violence.

 Recommendation for mitigating identified risks is based on industry best practices, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Association of School Boards, and the Texas State University School Safety Center.

<u>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</u>

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a set of design principles used to discourage crime and promote building security. CPTED principles are based on anticipating the thought processes of a potential offender and creating an environment that discourages follow-through. CPTED has the added advantage of creating a sense of security and well-being among employees and tenants.

CPTED follows four principles of design;

Natural Surveillance
Criminals do not like to be seen or recognized, so they will choose situations where they can hide and easily escape.

Natural Access Control
Criminals like to feel that they are in control. However, this sense of control can be denied by clearly marking the approaches to buildings and properties and channeling visitors into a defined area.

Territorial Reinforcement
The purpose of this principle is to create a clear distinction between public and private property. This is important for two reasons: Legitimate occupants have a sense of ownership and will notice, and even challenge, people who don't belong; intruders, on the other hand, have a harder time blending in.

Maintenance

Maintenance is related to territorial reinforcement. A well-maintained area sends the message that people notice and care about what happens in an area. This, in turn discourages vandalism and other crimes. Security practitioners refer to the "Broken Windows Theory," the idea that one broken window will entice vandals to break another. A vandalized area then becomes more inviting to higher levels of crime. A property should be well-maintained as a matter of safety as well as pride.

Target Hardening
Target hardening is another strategy often mentioned in connection with CPTED. This simply means making a building more difficult to forcibly enter.

WOCCISD- CPTED ANALYISIS:
CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Good
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Very Good
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good

Author: D. Hunt

Doors   Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement   Very Good

WOCCISD - CPTED ANALYISIS:
CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance   Good
Traffic Accessibility   Average
Lighting   Good
Cameras   Good
Natural Access Control   Average
Landscape Designs   Good
Entrances and Vestibules   Good
Security Lighting   Good
Building Location   Good
Signage   Good
Sidewalks and walkways   Good
Doors   Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement   Very Good

Rating scheme
Excellent	Very high quality or standards for security and or safety.
Very Good	High quality or standards for security and or safety.
Good	Exceeds standards for security and or safety.
Average	Meets standards for security and or safety.
Needs Improvement	Does not meet standards for security and or safety
Deficient	Lacking standards and is inadequate for security and or safety.

Layers and Rings of Protection
Layers of protection represent procedural and physical countermeasures that protect assets. The following categories are associated with layers of protection designed to provide an acceptable level of security for personnel and the facility itself.

External
1.   Facility Complex Access Control (Gates, Signage, Guard, Traffic Routing, etc..)
2.   Building Access Control (Electronic badge access, mechanical locks, etc.)
3.   Video Surveillance system (cameras)
4.   Environmental Design (building compound arrangement)

Author: D. Hunt

5.   Maintenance and activity support
6.   Fencing and parking gates
7.   Signage
8.   Lighting
9.   Locked utilities
10.   Security Personnel Patrols

Internal
1.   Associate Badge System (electronic, physical ID's, other)
2.   Campus Police Officer
3.   Centralized access points and entrances
4.   Visitor check in and checkout procedures
5.   Associate hiring and screening procedures
6.   Secured internal layers of doors, locks and authorized areas
7.   Camera monitoring
8.   Door alarms
9.   Motion sensor devices
10.   Lighting
11.   High visibility and open work areas
12.   Locked entrances to electrical, utility, plant and maintenance areas
13.   Personnel accountability system
14.   Key controls
15.   Asset and inventory controls
16.   Interior maintenance and activity support
17.   Fire Suppression systems
18.   Alarm and alert systems
19.   Associate policies, procedures and training programs
20.   Communications systems (redundant)
21.   Emergency and crisis plan, procedures and controls

Potential Threats or Losses

These are a list of potential security threats that may impact safety and security of the facility and or personnel.
1.   Workplace violence
2.   External sabotage
3.   Internal sabotage
4.   Terrorist attack
5.   Systems or facility tampering
6.   Theft
7.   Robbery
8.   Assault
9.   Explosion
10.   Abduction
11.   Arson

12.   Vandalism

Physical Security

 A review of the physical security conditions at the West Orange – Cove Consolidated Independent School District Elementary School addressed the facility environment from an "outside – in" approach. This considers the facility geographic layout relative to the design's ability to mitigate potential security risks from the outside, and migrates to the specific physical and procedural security mechanisms on site designed to protect personnel and assets.

The West Orange -Cove CISD Elementary School overall physical security assessment is "AVERAGE"

External Physical Security:

15. Findings: The WOCCISD Elementary School Access to the property by both vehicular and foot traffic is uninhibited and easily obtained only from the front of the building for visitors and employees' access.
16. Access gates, fencing, or signage exists to deter unauthorized entry or to channel persons to a centralized reception area.
17. The open and uncontrolled access does not create a significant security risk a person or persons entering the building are challenged by a receptionist and do not have direct access to any areas of the building, and are not allowed to walk around un-escorted
18. Video surveillance cameras were observed around several of the buildings and provided more than ample coverage of the perimeter areas. At the time of the assessment, all of the building cameras are functioning...

Recommendations:
.

- •   Designate visitor parking area and install adequate signage directing persons where to park. Reconfigure the parking lot to adequately support bus pick up traffic and parent pick—up, at the time of this assessment the issue appears very chaotic.
- •   Additional external cameras are needed to provide full visibility of driveways, property perimeters, and all sides.

.

Author: D. Hunt

An electronic access control badge system has been installed to provide a high level of monitored and vetted access for all persons and ensures the area of building is covered by the system should be maintained in a secure mode. It has an inherent weakness from the human element from people holding doors but our current systems are not alarmed to notify when a door has been left open. The system should be monitored by security personnel.

- It is recommended a single point of entry be established for all visitors, to include parents, former students, contractors, etc., and clear and visible signage be posted directing persons to that area.
- Visitors should present valid ID and have a verified reason as well as a specific person they are meeting prior to being issued a visitors' badge. The badge should list location authorized to be visited
- All visitors should be escorted by an employee if possible.

An electronic visitor tracking system should be employed for establishing and maintaining a database of visitors. A standardized Regional system could maintain a centralized database of visitors and provide alerts for persons who could pose a risk. Such a system when employed on a common network ties all school facilities together to identify visitors, reduce costs of purchasing, and general maintenance of the system

Video Management System (VMS) – *Security cameras*

19. **Findings:** WOCCISD Administration Complex is equipped with cameras operating on a Video Insight software system installed August 2019. Cameras are mounted both internally and externally of new cameras on the same network. Coverage by external cameras does adequately cover all buildings and parking lot that has public access areas onto the property. No perimeter coverage exists for the rear or the north side of the building.

   m. Camera quality is more than adequate during daytime and nighttime viewing (Good quality during low light) Installation of the cameras was of good quality.
   n. Administration of the system is sufficient (The inhouse IT team has adequate training or administrative rights to the system)
   o. It was unknown if original camera IP addresses were changed which can present vulnerabilities to the system
   p. Its also unknown if the district IT professional has inspected the Video software system for risks to the school network.

3.1. **Recommendations:** Video systems are for the most part a reactionary tool used for conducting investigations or obtaining information after an event. Few organizations conduct active monitoring of video systems and for this reason it is imperative the recording times for all cameras should have at least a 30-day storage period. The cameras themselves provide some level of deterrence since they are highly visible around the complex.

- Additional external cameras should be installed to ensure coverage on all sides of all buildings. Rather than continue with the same quality, style, and manufacturer camera units, consider using 270-degree cameras on building corners to provide full coverage along two sides of the building, thus leading to fewer cameras being installed.
- Require security vendor to provide documented formulas for how a particular camera type was selected to ensure the view meets the required quality (pixels on target). There is a mathematical formula for determining camera specifications to meet the requirements for each location. This ensures the right camera is used in each setting and is based on the area of coverage needed and the quality of picture obtained.
- Identify the recorded frame rate for each camera and ensure the recorded sample provides adequate quality (too low of a frame rate leads to choppy or unclear video with loss of activity coverage and too fast of a frame rate may eat up too much storage space for no reason)
- Conduct research on camera types and prices rather than being told what camera will be installed and what the cost is going to be (use competitive bids when possible) Establish procedures for conducting regular reviews of camera recordings and to verify functionality of the system. A common practice is to scroll through "critical" camera views each morning at an accelerated speed to identify any suspicious activity. This makes you aware of things you would otherwise have no idea had occurred, and shows which cameras are functioning properly.
- Ensure a district IT employee is trained to troubleshoot the video software and inspect network appliances to ensure serviceability. If this is not available, engage the security company to discuss a maintenance agreement or establish service call criteria and priorities.
- Recommend the district and/or region adopt a standardized video management system that can be interconnected on one network. This improves functionality, maintenance, familiarity with the operations, and ensures best pricing. Avoid using residential quality systems to save money – commercial quality exists for a reason and will last long enough to see a return on the investment.

Internal Physical Security:

Findings: In keeping with the layered approach of creating multiple security barriers, the physical aspects inside the buildings play a significant role in enhancing overall safety and security. Building on enhancements from exterior areas which are recommended to begin at the property perimeter boundaries, we have developed methods to deny and deter unwanted entry at the furthest points from personnel and assets as well as methods of early identification.
 Each layer offers an opportunity to identify and interdict a threat before an adverse action is initiated and the enhancement of physical security inside the buildings creates additional layers on top of the external measures.

The following internal security findings were observed:

a. A functioning fire alarm system throughout the complex. Fire pull stations were in all buildings were functional. Fire extinguishers were in an enclosed case, the sprinkler systems are installed in the buildings. It should be noted the auditors were advised the school passed all inspections.
b. The physical structure of doors and locks in all buildings were observed to be in good condition and in working order
c. Emergency exit doors were equipped with proper push bars and were locked

4.1 Recommendations: Overall the internal physical security structure of the site is Good. Lighting is good throughout the buildings and each building is equipped with adequate avenues for egress.
 Recommendations for improving the overall internal security conditions as part of the layered security approach are more procedural than physical and will be addressed as a separate category. Physical enhancements are as follows:
• For doors with glass panels, a drop-down window covering is recommended to prevent viewing into the room from outside in the event of a lockdown
• The ability to exit each room through a window should be considered when available. If windows do not open, a glass breakage device should be available
• Panic alarm activation buttons are installed at critical points throughout the school and at a minimum be installed in the main office, and the nurse's station and attendance causing a blue light to flash in the hallways.

Policies and Procedures

20. A critical part of any organization's security program are the documented emergency action plans, procedures, and policies designed to provide guidance and clarity to personnel so they can effectively manage events. Developing emergency action plans is most effective when the plans and procedures are part of a comprehensive Crisis Management Program which gives structure and support to the implantation of those plans and procedures.
 Under the Texas Unified School Safety and Security Standards issued by Texas State University, the development of a multi-hazard preparedness plan consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a requirement as listed in the Texas Education Code, 37.108, as well as being recommended in various FEMA guidance documents.
 Although a Crisis Management Program is an all-hazards response program that extends beyond security related events, it is still a critical function for school security activities and plans an integral function in effectively planning for and responding to events.

Regardless of what the documents or procedures are named, it is important to develop plans and procedures to address how emergency events will be managed, who performs what tasks, who is in charge, etc. An emergency response plan can address the all-hazards

issue and provide specific guidance through the different events, but this plan needs to be written and formally adopted by the organization. All personnel should be trained and held responsible for compliance with these plans. Whether there is one or multiple plans, areas that must be addressed are:

•Site Security – Assigning a responsible person to oversee the security program, update assessments, and ensure all security needs are addressed. Tasks can be delegated across multiple areas and persons but one person needs to own the program and ensure the tasks are completed and the security procedures are adhered to.

•Emergency Response – How the organization responds to a variety of events, from environmental events, to human hazard events. How does the organization prepare in advance to mitigate impact, how and who is managing the event while it is active, and how does the organization recover following an event? All of these things need to be considered and planned for as part of the Crisis Management Program.
   Such a program can be isolated within the district or part of a larger organizational support structure but it needs to be in place.

•Safety Plans/ Medical / Pandemic Plans
•MOU's – Does the organization have any MOU's with other agencies (government, NGO's, etc.). These plans should be included as part of the overall operational plans.

District Safety and Security Committee

• The Texas Education Code (Sec 37.109) suggest the formation of a safety and security committee as well as developing processes to identify and appropriately assist individuals who exhibit signs of violent, harmful, or risky behavior, and/or pose a threat of committing criminal activity.
• These initiatives highlight the need for a monitoring group to track information and monitor social media for information that would allow early interdiction into undesirable behavior that could escalate into violent action.
• The establishment of an online reporting site and/or call in number for people to report suspicious or unusual behavior or general concerns that can be followed up on is recommended. Early identification and intervention are crucial to preventing acts of violence

.   ## Critical Security Event Assessment – Active Shooter Events
Active Shooter events are a major concern for all schools and no area of the country is exempt from these occurrences. Rural areas are no less susceptible than urban areas when it comes to this type of violent event. Several factors predicate the outcome should such an event occur. It should be noted that few facilities are 100% secure or inaccessible to a determined intruder so the actions taken when an event occurs will determine the outcome for the most part. Advance warning of the threat, the ability to deny access, and the ability to positively interdict the threat are of the utmost importance in reducing the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. A comprehensive

action plan must be developed, trained, and practiced in order to create an effective program and deterrent to such events.

Several steps to consider in establishing such a program are:

 • Adopt an Active Shooter Awareness Training Program. Numerous programs currently exist and are available for use at no cost. Each has its own response perspective and selection should be based on the environment and culture of each organization. Examples of these are the, "Run, Hide, Fight" and "Avoid, Deny, Defend" programs. At a minimum, all staff should be given this awareness training and if acceptable, students should also be exposed to some or all of the training points.

• Operational Response Plans Developed – as part of the emergency response plans for the organization, clear response plans should be developed and practiced. These plans include notification methods (how the threat is communicated to everyone), lockdown or lockout procedures, shelter in place, creating safe areas, evacuation procedures, etc…

• Communication procedures in response to an active shooter can range from an audible alarm, PA system, emails, texts, bullhorns, and a variety of other methods. Careful consideration should be taken as to the most effective method that will get the message out without compromising the response plan to the intruder. *Cellular programs such as "WhatsApp" and "Signal" are good communication programs that can use group messaging to push messages out in a two-way communication. This can be more effective and reliable than hand held radios.*

• One major problem with an active shooter is identifying where he is, where he is moving to, and how to let everyone know so they can take effective evasive action. A recommendation from this auditor is to consider the electronic notification system for Active Shooter events known as, "ASR" or Active Shooter Response. This is an activation station similar to a fire pull station that when activated sends texts and emails to everyone in the system, to include emergency response personnel. The benefit of this type of system is the location of the shooter is identified by the activation station and each new activation identifies movement and a new location. Since response time to interdict an active shooter is critical, this immediate notification speeds up that notification process while at the same time allowing persons at the site to make informed decisions about movement away from the threat.

• As a follow on to the previous recommendation, past events have shown that most school shooting events end as soon as the shooter is confronted by an armed response. As such, the ability to interdict the action by inserting an armed responder is the most decisive action that can be taken to end the event. The previous recommendations throughout this assessment are all designed to create layers of security to "harden" the target by creating concentric rings of physical barriers to impede movement throughout the facility. Adding in robust response plans provides the proactive measure of moving people away from the threat

Together these actions constitute the organization's critical event response program or emergency response plan which is a critical part of effectively managing a violent action. A detailed description and recommendation for the ARMED response capability within the West Orange-Stark High School is as follows:

Armed Programs and Recommendations West Orange-Cove CISD

The State of Texas allows for the armed protection of our schools and has set forth the standards and requirements for the approved programs. It should be made very clear that the carrying of a

firearm on school property is closely regulated in the State of Texas and the laws should be fully understood and complied with.

The State of Texas authorizes security responses under the authority of the Texas Education Code, Texas Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedures. Any action taken by West Orange-Cove CISD with regard to the adoption of one of the state's approved programs should be fully reviewed by the district's legal department and guidance issued by that department should be followed. The district assumes great liability in adopting and implementing an armed response program and should consider the type of program being adopted, the level of training and support the district is willing to provide, existing response assets, and all mitigation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of an event.

The state of Texas offers several options to schools to provide armed protection and response. Each program has rules and regulations that must be complied with

See attached program information and link;(School Marshals and other District personnel Carrying Firearms).

- **School Marshall Program**
a.   Allows for one Marshall per site with 200 students in daily attendance
b.   Appointment of the Marshall is made by the Board of Trustees
c.   Requires specific law enforcement licensing and training
d.   Plainclothes position(armed) unless position as part of regular duties in direct contact with students – in this case the weapon must be locked up
e.   Requires use of specific ammunition (frangible)

- **School Resource Officer (SRO) – Active Law Enforcement Officer**
a.   District may hire an on or off-duty law enforcement officer
b.   Officer in uniform
c.   May be a shared resource with other schools

- **Guardian Program – Armed School Safety Employee**
b.   District grants written permission to carry a firearm on campus
c.   Carries firearm not pursuant to a handgun license but by written authority under Section 46.03, Tx Att'y Gen Op No GA-1051.
d.   School is mandated to coordinate with local law enforcement when having armed employees at the school (Tx Ed Code 37.108(a((3)
e.   Additional training through state certified programs is recommended
f.   School District assumes full liability for the armed employee's actions

- **Private Security – Uniformed and armed security guard**
d.   District may hire a licensed private security company to provide a uniformed, armed guard to patrol campus

Armed Personnel and Program Discussion

Author: D. Hunt

The decision to consider having an armed presence at the school is a matter taken very seriously. A tremendous amount of liability comes with each program as well as with the decision to not use any of them. There are inherent flaws and risks with each program so they need to be carefully examined to determine which if any is appropriate for a given environment. Some items to consider in this discussion are:

a. Response time of local law enforcement
b. Capability of local law enforcement
c. School funding for program
d. Availability of qualified armed personnel (private or employee)
e. Emotional climate (parents, board members, general public, law enforcement)

In dissecting each program, there are positives and negatives to each which will be given a cursory discussion here;

School Marshall Program – This program brings a state certified peace officer with specific law enforcement training to the campus. The district hires this person so they have the opportunity to interview and assess the person. This is a plainclothes position and the Marshall is an employee of the district. They may carry a concealed firearm unless they have a dual role that brings them in direct contact with students, in which case they must lock their firearm up and it must be in close proximity to them at all times. The district incurs the cost of the Marshall as an added head count since they are employees. Those costs will include benefits in addition to salary which can drive the cost of the program beyond many district's funding ability.

District Police Department or School Resource Officer (SRO) – This program allows a district to enter into an MOU with a local law enforcement agency to hire officers to work in uniform either full or part time. Since a uniformed officer is a strong deterrent to a violent offender, this program offers great benefit in that the officer is not an employee, their actions are covered by their agency, as well as any injuries incurred while enforcing the law, and they present that key feature that an official presence can confront a perpetrator. Being uniformed and armed, employed by a government agency, not an added head count or subject to benefit packages, and trained to perform the function they are being hired to do makes this a highly desirable option.

Guardian Program – The school district selects an employee and authorizes them to be armed on school property. The district assumes full liability for the actions of this employee and may even pay an extra stipend for the person to perform this task. The state has a two day certification training program and requires the candidate to have a concealed handgun license in the State of Texas. One of several issues with this program is selecting and training an individual to enter a violent event with a firearm in order to act to end the aggression.
This is a difficult task with professionally trained law enforcement personnel, let alone someone who has not encountered that type of environment. Added to this is the requirement that firearms proficiency for this environment far exceeds most police firearms training courses since there is a high probability of striking another person when shooting inside a school.

Author: D. Hunt

Active Shooter events are dynamic, high stress events that require professional interdiction with no hesitation. That level of competence is difficult at best to obtain from the majority of available personnel for this program and should be considered as the last resort to an armed response, or possibly as a supplement to another program.

One operational positive to this program would be to implement it as a defensive action whereby the armed employee defended a room rather than aggressing against a perpetrator. Designated safe rooms could be defended by several armed employees who used the firearm as a last defense rather than exceeding their skill level or capability by moving directly to the threat.

Summary

In essence the overall security environment for the West Orange Cove CISD Elementary School is rated as AVERAGE The lack of historical events and a favorable social environment for the area helps support a relatively safe environment compared to many other areas. This environment has also fostered a lack of urgency to identify and correct some of the issues identified in this assessment and the congenial relationships harbor a false sense of security and safety.

In the security profession, Hope is not considered a strategy and as history has shown, active shooter events occur in environments similar to this one so it is incumbent on the district to make improvements, develop plans of action, provide training to personnel, engage the district police and local law enforcement to discuss response strategies, and engage the school board to develop a unified strategy.

Remaining cognizant of limited and competing resources, a prioritized list of actions should be developed. Items providing the best return in terms of enhanced security in relation to overall cost should be implemented first keeping in mind that many of the suggested remedies may be the lowest expenditures or may be procedural in nature.

  Armed with a list of needed improvements, projected implementation and budget proposals can be developed. Not all items and deficiencies can be corrected immediately but a roadmap for taking positive action to enhance the overall security conditions can be developed and planned for.

Program Support:

A Security and Threat Assessment is a good start at evaluating risks and vulnerabilities; however, without supporting an organization through these improvements, it has little value. As a follow up to this initial assessment, The WOCCISD Police Department is prepared to support our district in developing emergency response plans and procedures, training personnel, assisting in managing table top exercises, and providing expert training should the district decide to pursue any above listed program on our campus (es).

Threat Assessments are site specific and even though they tend to have similarities in the areas being assessed, are still very individualistic with different variables. For most organizations, having individual assessments contracted can be cost prohibitive and, must be revisited periodically for they are not sustainable for a long-term program.

 Assessments have a shelf life and should be reevaluated annually at a minimum. Performing these assessments requires specific training but that does not mean a school district cannot perform their own; it just requires them to be trained.

Author: D. Hunt

One approach is to offer a Train the Trainer (T3) Program to instruct selected district employees to conduct the assessments and follow through the process to include recommendations and action plans. Training a select group to perform this task guarantees the district can, over a long period, perform this valuable function and comply with state mandates that continue to develop in this arena. This approach offers considerable cost savings to the district versus contracting services for each site. The program and training can be made available should this be seen as a viable option.

Appendix

School Door Barricades

Several styles of door barricades are available and are relatively inexpensive. Schools can direct purchase these items and install them themselves. These offer a great improvement in the denial of entry against an intruder, are easily operated, and are inexpensive.

Active Shooter Response (Electronic notification system) - ASR

<u>*Assessment Completed by*</u>:
Chief Darryl C. Hunt
dhunt@woccisd.net
West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Police Department
1400 Newton Street
Orange, Texas 77630

This report is intended solely for the use of West Orange -Cove CISD and should not be recreated or copied for use at facilities or sites other than the sites assessed in this document without prior written permission from West Orange -Cove Consolidated School District
This document is considered CONFIDENTIAL and should be safeguarded and the information contained within protected.

West Orange -Cove Consolidated Independent School District

Site Security and Threat Assessment

Administration Complex/Alternative Center

Dr. Rickie Harris, Superintendent

902 West Park Ave

Orange, Texas 77630

Security Consultant: Darryl C. Hunt

Police Chief WOCCISD Police Department

April 27, 2020

Table of Contents

Introduction

The following information documents the Security and Threat Assessment conducted for the WOCCISD Administration Complex/ Alternative Center located at, 902 West Park Ave, Orange, Tx.77630, and was conducted on site on April 26, 2020

The Administration/ Alternative Center complex consists of two main primary buildings, for the school districts administrations operations and alternative learning center the district has 412 employees and 40 working within the complexes.

Author: D. Hunt

This document contains a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the current physical and operational conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. Recommendations are included for consideration to improve overall security and reduce risks to personnel, operations, and facilities through implementation of countermeasures and mitigating strategies to detect and deter threats.

The scope of the assessment is limited to the physical and operational security of the WOCCISD school campuses and does not include a "Multi-Hazards" approach addressing other risk conditions such as environmental, cyber, or economic risks. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate existing security conditions relative to the physical components of the facilities and the operational plans and protocols in place to respond to potential acts of violence.

 Recommendation for mitigating identified risks is based on industry best practices, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Association of School Boards, and the Texas State University School Safety Center.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a set of design principles used to discourage crime and promote building security. CPTED principles are based on anticipating the thought processes of a potential offender and creating an environment that discourages follow-through. CPTED has the added advantage of creating a sense of security and well-being among employees and tenants.

CPTED follows four principles of design;

Natural Surveillance

Criminals do not like to be seen or recognized, so they will choose situations where they can hide and easily escape.

Natural Access Control

Criminals like to feel that they are in control. However, this sense of control can be denied by clearly marking the approaches to buildings and properties and channeling visitors into a defined area.

Territorial Reinforcement

The purpose of this principle is to create a clear distinction between public and private property. This is important for two reasons: Legitimate occupants have a sense of ownership and will notice, and even challenge, people who don't belong; intruders, on the other hand, have a harder time blending in.

Maintenance

Maintenance is related to territorial reinforcement. A well-maintained area sends the message that people notice and care about what happens in an area. This, in turn discourages vandalism and other crimes. Security practitioners refer to the "Broken Windows Theory," the idea that one broken window will entice vandals to break another. A vandalized area then becomes more inviting to higher levels of crime. A property should be well-maintained as a matter of safety as well as pride.

Target Hardening

Target hardening is another strategy often mentioned in connection with CPTED. This simply means making a building more difficult to forcibly enter.

WOCCISD- CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Good
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Very Good
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

WOCCISD - CPTED ANALYISIS:

CPTED Principle Rating

Natural Surveillance	Good
Traffic Accessibility	Good
Lighting	Good
Cameras	Good
Natural Access Control	Average
Landscape Designs	Good
Entrances and Vestibules	Good
Security Lighting	Good
Building Location	Good
Signage	Very Good
Sidewalks and walkways	Very Good
Doors	Very Good
Territorial Reinforcement	Very Good

Rating scheme

Excellent	Very high quality or standards for security and or safety.
Very Good	High quality or standards for security and or safety.
Good	Exceeds standards for security and or safety.
Average	Meets standards for security and or safety.
Needs Improvement	Does not meet standards for security and or safety
Deficient	Lacking standards and is inadequate for security and or safety.

Author: D. Hunt

Layers and Rings of Protection

Layers of protection represent procedural and physical countermeasures that protect assets. The following categories are associated with layers of protection designed to provide an acceptable level of security for personnel and the facility itself.

External

1.   Facility Complex Access Control (Gates, Signage, Guard, Traffic Routing, etc..)

2.   Building Access Control (Electronic badge access, mechanical locks, etc.)

3.   Video Surveillance system (cameras)

4.   Environmental Design (building compound arrangement)

5.   Maintenance and activity support

6.   Fencing and parking gates

7.   Signage

8.   Lighting

9.   Locked utilities

10.   Security Personnel Patrols

Internal

1.   Associate Badge System (electronic, physical ID's, other)

2.   Campus Police Officer

3.   Centralized access points and entrances

4.   Visitor check in and checkout procedures

5.   Associate hiring and screening procedures

6.   Secured internal layers of doors, locks and authorized areas

7.   Camera monitoring

8.   Door alarms

9.   Motion sensor devices

10.   Lighting

11.   High visibility and open work areas

12.   Locked entrances to electrical, utility, plant and maintenance areas

Author: D. Hunt

13.   Personnel accountability system

14.   Key controls

15.   Asset and inventory controls

16.   Interior maintenance and activity support

17.   Fire Suppression systems

18.   Alarm and alert systems

19.   Associate policies, procedures and training programs

20.   Communications systems (redundant)

21.   Emergency and crisis plan, procedures and controls

Potential Threats or Losses

These are a list of potential security threats that may impact safety and security of the facility and or personnel.

1.   Workplace violence

2.   External sabotage

3.   Internal sabotage

4.   Terrorist attack

5.   Systems or facility tampering

6.   Theft

7.   Robbery

8.   Assault

9.   Explosion

10.   Abduction

11.   Arson

12.   Vandalism

Physical Security

 A review of the physical security conditions at the West Orange – Cove Consolidated Independent School District Administration complex addressed the facility environment from an

"outside – in" approach. This considers the facility geographic layout relative to the design's ability to mitigate potential security risks from the outside, and migrates to the specific physical and procedural security mechanisms on site designed to protect personnel and assets.

The West Orange -Cove CISD Administration Complex overall physical security assessment is "Very Good"

External Physical Security:

21. Findings: The WOCCISD Administration complex is a unique in designs it, has been renovated from a former elementary school (Anderson Elementary) with a complete new interior of the building, which consists of office areas, meeting space, Access to the property by both vehicular and foot traffic is uninhibited and easily obtained only from the front of the building for visitors while employees have access at the rear of a fenced in parking area utilizing their employee badge. of the property.
22. Access gates, fencing, or signage exists to deter unauthorized entry or to channel persons to a centralized reception area.
23. The open and uncontrolled access does not create a significant security risk a person or persons entering the building are challenged by a receptionist and do not have direct access to any areas of the building, and are not allowed to walk around un-escorted. In addition to the Administration building, the Alternative Center doors remain locked at all times access into the building does not go unchallenged with a metal detector at the entrance.
24. Video surveillance cameras were observed around several of the buildings and provided more than ample coverage of the perimeter areas. At the time of the assessment, all of the building cameras are functioning...

Recommendations:

- • Provide a glass barrier between the receptionist and the public.
- • Designate visitor parking area and install adequate signage directing persons where to park.
- • Additional external cameras are needed to provide full visibility of driveways, property perimeters, and all sides

.

An electronic access control badge system has been installed to provide a high level of monitored and vetted access for all persons and ensures the area of building is covered by the system should be maintained in a secure mode. It has an inherent weakness from the human element from people holding doors but our current systems are not alarmed to notify when a door has been left open. The system should be monitored by security personnel.

- It is recommended a single point of entry be established for all visitors, to include parents, former students, contractors, etc., and clear and visible signage be posted directing persons to that area.

- Visitors should present valid ID and have a verified reason as well as a specific person they are meeting prior to being issued a visitors' badge. The badge should list location authorized to be visited

- All visitors should be escorted by an employee if possible.

An electronic visitor tracking system should be employed for establishing and maintaining a database of visitors. A standardized Regional system could maintain a centralized database of visitors and provide alerts for persons who could pose a risk. Such a system when employed on a common network ties all school facilities together to identify visitors, reduce costs of purchasing, and general maintenance of the system

Video Management System (VMS) – *Security cameras*

25. **Findings:** WOCCISD Administration Complex is equipped with cameras operating on a Video Insight software system installed August 2019. Cameras are mounted both internally and externally of new cameras on the same network. Coverage by external cameras does adequately cover all buildings and parking lot that has public access areas onto the property. No perimeter coverage exists for the rear or the north side of the building.

q. Camera quality is more than adequate during daytime and nighttime viewing (Good quality during low light) Installation of the cameras was of good quality.
r. Administration of the system is sufficient (The inhouse IT team has adequate training or administrative rights to the system)
s. It was unknown if original camera IP addresses were changed which can present vulnerabilities to the system
t. Its also unknown if the district IT professional has inspected the Video software system for risks to the school network.

3.1. **Recommendations:** Video systems are for the most part a reactionary tool used for conducting investigations or obtaining information after an event. Few organizations conduct active monitoring of video systems and for this reason it is imperative the recording times for all cameras should have at least a 30-day storage period. The cameras

themselves provide some level of deterrence since they are highly visible around the complex.

- Additional external cameras should be installed to ensure coverage on all sides of all buildings. Rather than continue with the same quality, style, and manufacturer camera units, consider using 270-degree cameras on building corners to provide full coverage along two sides of the building, thus leading to fewer cameras being installed.

- Require security vendor to provide documented formulas for how a particular camera type was selected to ensure the view meets the required quality (pixels on target). There is a mathematical formula for determining camera specifications to meet the requirements for each location. This ensures the right camera is used in each setting and is based on the area of coverage needed and the quality of picture obtained.

- Identify the recorded frame rate for each camera and ensure the recorded sample provides adequate quality (too low of a frame rate leads to choppy or unclear video with loss of activity coverage and too fast of a frame rate may eat up too much storage space for no reason)

- Conduct research on camera types and prices rather than being told what camera will be installed and what the cost is going to be (use competitive bids when possible) Establish procedures for conducting regular reviews of camera recordings and to verify functionality of the system. A common practice is to scroll through "critical" camera views each morning at an accelerated speed to identify any suspicious activity. This makes you aware of things you would otherwise have no idea had occurred, and shows which cameras are functioning properly.

- Ensure a district IT employee is trained to troubleshoot the video software and inspect network appliances to ensure serviceability. If this is not available, engage the security company to discuss a maintenance agreement or establish service call criteria and priorities.

- Recommend the district and/or region adopt a standardized video management system that can be interconnected on one network. This improves functionality, maintenance, familiarity with the operations, and ensures best pricing. Avoid using residential quality systems to save money – commercial quality exists for a reason and will last long enough to see a return on the investment.

Internal Physical Security:

Findings: In keeping with the layered approach of creating multiple security barriers, the physical aspects inside the buildings play a significant role in enhancing overall safety and security. Building on enhancements from exterior areas which are recommended to begin at the

property perimeter boundaries, we have developed methods to deny and deter unwanted entry at the furthest points from personnel and assets as well as methods of early identification.

Each layer offers an opportunity to identify and interdict a threat before an adverse action is initiated and the enhancement of physical security inside the buildings creates additional layers on top of the external measures.

The following internal security findings were observed:

a. A functioning fire alarm system throughout the complex. Fire pull stations were in all buildings were functional. Fire extinguishers were in an enclosed case, the sprinkler systems are installed in the buildings. It should be noted the auditors were advised the school passed all inspections.

b. The physical structure of doors and locks in all buildings were observed to be in good condition and in working order

c. Emergency exit doors were equipped with proper push bars and were locked

4.1 Recommendations: Overall the internal physical security structure of the site is Good. Lighting is good throughout the buildings and each building is equipped with adequate avenues for egress.

Recommendations for improving the overall internal security conditions as part of the layered security approach are more procedural than physical and will be addressed as a separate category. Physical enhancements are as follows:

• For doors with glass panels, a drop-down window covering is recommended to prevent viewing into the room from outside in the event of a lockdown

• The ability to exit each room through a window should be considered when available. If windows do not open, a glass breakage device should be available

• Panic alarm activation buttons are installed at critical points throughout the school and at a minimum be installed in the main office, and the nurse's station and attendance causing a blue light to flash in the hallways.

Policies and Procedures

26. A critical part of any organization's security program are the documented emergency action plans, procedures, and policies designed to provide guidance and clarity to personnel so they can effectively manage events. Developing emergency action plans is most effective when the plans and procedures are part of a comprehensive Crisis

Management Program which gives structure and support to the implantation of those plans and procedures.

Under the Texas Unified School Safety and Security Standards issued by Texas State University, the development of a multi-hazard preparedness plan consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a requirement as listed in the Texas Education Code, 37.108, as well as being recommended in various FEMA guidance documents.

Although a Crisis Management Program is an all-hazards response program that extends beyond security related events, it is still a critical function for school security activities and plans an integral function in effectively planning for and responding to events.

Regardless of what the documents or procedures are named, it is important to develop plans and procedures to address how emergency events will be managed, who performs what tasks, who is in charge, etc. An emergency response plan can address the all-hazards issue and provide specific guidance through the different events, but this plan needs to be written and formally adopted by the organization. All personnel should be trained and held responsible for compliance with these plans. Whether there is one or multiple plans, areas that must be addressed are:

•Site Security – Assigning a responsible person to oversee the security program, update assessments, and ensure all security needs are addressed. Tasks can be delegated across multiple areas and persons but one person needs to own the program and ensure the tasks are completed and the security procedures are adhered to.

•Emergency Response – How the organization responds to a variety of events, from environmental events, to human hazard events. How does the organization prepare in advance to mitigate impact, how and who is managing the event while it is active, and how does the organization recover following an event? All of these things need to be considered and planned for as part of the Crisis Management Program.
  Such a program can be isolated within the district or part of a larger organizational support structure but it needs to be in place.

•Safety Plans/ Medical / Pandemic Plans
•MOU's – Does the organization have any MOU's with other agencies (government, NGO's, etc.). These plans should be included as part of the overall operational plans.

District Safety and Security Committee

• The Texas Education Code (Sec 37.109) suggest the formation of a safety and security committee as well as developing processes to identify and appropriately assist individuals who exhibit signs of violent, harmful, or risky behavior, and/or pose a threat of committing criminal activity.

Author: D. Hunt

• These initiatives highlight the need for a monitoring group to track information and monitor social media for information that would allow early interdiction into undesirable behavior that could escalate into violent action.

• The establishment of an online reporting site and/or call in number for people to report suspicious or unusual behavior or general concerns that can be followed up on is recommended. Early identification and intervention are crucial to preventing acts of violence

. <u>Critical Security Event Assessment – Active Shooter Events</u>

Active Shooter events are a major concern for all schools and no area of the country is exempt from these occurrences. Rural areas are no less susceptible than urban areas when it comes to this type of violent event. Several factors predicate the outcome should such an event occur. It should be noted that few facilities are 100% secure or inaccessible to a determined intruder so the actions taken when an event occurs will determine the outcome for the most part. Advance warning of the threat, the ability to deny access, and the ability to positively interdict the threat are of the utmost importance in reducing the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. A comprehensive action plan must be developed, trained, and practiced in order to create an effective program and deterrent to such events.

Several steps to consider in establishing such a program are:

• Adopt an Active Shooter Awareness Training Program. Numerous programs currently exist and are available for use at no cost. Each has its own response perspective and selection should be based on the environment and culture of each organization. Examples of these are the, "Run, Hide, Fight" and "Avoid, Deny, Defend" programs. At a minimum, all staff should be given this awareness training and if acceptable, students should also be exposed to some or all of the training points.

• Operational Response Plans Developed – as part of the emergency response plans for the organization, clear response plans should be developed and practiced. These plans include notification methods (how the threat is communicated to everyone), lockdown or lockout procedures, shelter in place, creating safe areas, evacuation procedures, etc…

• Communication procedures in response to an active shooter can range from an audible alarm, PA system, emails, texts, bullhorns, and a variety of other methods. Careful consideration should be taken as to the most effective method that will get the message out without compromising the response plan to the intruder. *Cellular programs such as "WhatsApp" and "Signal" are good communication programs that can use group messaging to push messages out in a two-way communication. This can be more effective and reliable than hand held radios.*

• One major problem with an active shooter is identifying where he is, where he is moving to, and how to let everyone know so they can take effective evasive action. A recommendation from this auditor is to consider the electronic notification system for Active Shooter events known as, "ASR" or Active Shooter Response. This is an activation station similar to a fire pull station that

when activated sends texts and emails to everyone in the system, to include emergency response personnel. The benefit of this type of system is the location of the shooter is identified by the activation station and each new activation identifies movement and a new location. Since response time to interdict an active shooter is critical, this immediate notification speeds up that notification process while at the same time allowing persons at the site to make informed decisions about movement away from the threat.

• As a follow on to the previous recommendation, past events have shown that most school shooting events end as soon as the shooter is confronted by an armed response. As such, the ability to interdict the action by inserting an armed responder is the most decisive action that can be taken to end the event. The previous recommendations throughout this assessment are all designed to create layers of security to "harden" the target by creating concentric rings of physical barriers to impede movement throughout the facility. Adding in robust response plans provides the proactive measure of moving people away from the threat

Together these actions constitute the organization's critical event response program or emergency response plan which is a critical part of effectively managing a violent action. A detailed description and recommendation for the ARMED response capability within the West Orange-Stark High School is as follows:

Armed Programs and Recommendations West Orange-Cove CISD

The State of Texas allows for the armed protection of our schools and has set forth the standards and requirements for the approved programs. It should be made very clear that the carrying of a firearm on school property is closely regulated in the State of Texas and the laws should be fully understood and complied with.

 The State of Texas authorizes security responses under the authority of the Texas Education Code, Texas Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedures. Any action taken by West Orange-Cove CISD with regard to the adoption of one of the state's approved programs should be fully reviewed by the district's legal department and guidance issued by that department should be followed. The district assumes great liability in adopting and implementing an armed response program and should consider the type of program being adopted, the level of training and support the district is willing to provide, existing response assets, and all mitigation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of an event.

 The state of Texas offers several options to schools to provide armed protection and response. Each program has rules and regulations that must be complied with

See attached program information and link;(School Marshals and other District personnel Carrying Firearms).

- **School Marshall Program**

a.	Allows for one Marshall per site with 200 students in daily attendance

b.	Appointment of the Marshall is made by the Board of Trustees

Author: D. Hunt

c.   Requires specific law enforcement licensing and training

d.   Plainclothes position(armed) unless position as part of regular duties in direct contact with students – in this case the weapon must be locked up

e.   Requires use of specific ammunition (frangible)

*   **School Resource Officer (SRO) – Active Law Enforcement Officer**

a.   District may hire an on or off-duty law enforcement officer

b.   Officer in uniform

c.   May be a shared resource with other schools

*   **Guardian Program – Armed School Safety Employee**

b.   District grants written permission to carry a firearm on campus

c.   Carries firearm not pursuant to a handgun license but by written authority under Section 46.03, Tx Att'y Gen Op No GA-1051.

d.   School is mandated to coordinate with local law enforcement when having armed employees at the school (Tx Ed Code 37.108(a((3)

e.   Additional training through state certified programs is recommended

f.   School District assumes full liability for the armed employee's actions

*   **Private Security – Uniformed and armed security guard**

     e.   District may hire a licensed private security company to provide a uniformed, armed guard to patrol campus

Armed Personnel and Program Discussion

The decision to consider having an armed presence at the school is a matter taken very seriously. A tremendous amount of liability comes with each program as well as with the decision to not use any of them. There are inherent flaws and risks with each program so they need to be carefully examined to determine which if any is appropriate for a given environment. Some items to consider in this discussion are:

a. Response time of local law enforcement
b. Capability of local law enforcement
c. School funding for program

Author: D. Hunt

d. Availability of qualified armed personnel (private or employee)
e. Emotional climate (parents, board members, general public, law enforcement)

In dissecting each program, there are positives and negatives to each which will be given a cursory discussion here;

School Marshall Program – This program brings a state certified peace officer with specific law enforcement training to the campus. The district hires this person so they have the opportunity to interview and assess the person. This is a plainclothes position and the Marshall is an employee of the district. They may carry a concealed firearm unless they have a dual role that brings them in direct contact with students, in which case they must lock their firearm up and it must be in close proximity to them at all times. The district incurs the cost of the Marshall as an added head count since they are employees. Those costs will include benefits in addition to salary which can drive the cost of the program beyond many district's funding ability.

District Police Department or School Resource Officer (SRO) – This program allows a district to enter into an MOU with a local law enforcement agency to hire officers to work in uniform either full or part time. Since a uniformed officer is a strong deterrent to a violent offender, this program offers great benefit in that the officer is not an employee, their actions are covered by their agency, as well as any injuries incurred while enforcing the law, and they present that key feature that an official presence can confront a perpetrator. Being uniformed and armed, employed by a government agency, not an added head count or subject to benefit packages, and trained to perform the function they are being hired to do makes this a highly desirable option.

Guardian Program – The school district selects an employee and authorizes them to be armed on school property. The district assumes full liability for the actions of this employee and may even pay an extra stipend for the person to perform this task. The state has a two day certification training program and requires the candidate to have a concealed handgun license in the State of Texas. One of several issues with this program is selecting and training an individual to enter a violent event with a firearm in order to act to end the aggression.

This is a difficult task with professionally trained law enforcement personnel, let alone someone who has not encountered that type of environment. Added to this is the requirement that firearms proficiency for this environment far exceeds most police firearms training courses since there is a high probability of striking another person when shooting inside a school.

Active Shooter events are dynamic, high stress events that require professional interdiction with no hesitation. That level of competence is difficult at best to obtain from the majority of available personnel for this program and should be considered as the last resort to an armed response, or possibly as a supplement to another program.

Author: D. Hunt

One operational positive to this program would be to implement it as a defensive action whereby the armed employee defended a room rather than aggressing against a perpetrator. Designated safe rooms could be defended by several armed employees who used the firearm as a last defense rather than exceeding their skill level or capability by moving directly to the threat.

Summary

In essence the overall security environment for the West Orange Cove CISD is rated as Very Good. The lack of historical events and a favorable social environment for the area helps support a relatively safe environment compared to many other areas. This environment has also fostered a lack of urgency to identify and correct some of the issues identified in this assessment and the congenial relationships harbor a false sense of security and safety.

In the security profession, Hope is not considered a strategy and as history has shown, active shooter events occur in environments similar to this one so it is incumbent on the district to make improvements, develop plans of action, provide training to personnel, engage the district police and local law enforcement to discuss response strategies, and engage the school board to develop a unified strategy.

Remaining cognizant of limited and competing resources, a prioritized list of actions should be developed. Items providing the best return in terms of enhanced security in relation to overall cost should be implemented first keeping in mind that many of the suggested remedies may be the lowest expenditures or may be procedural in nature.

Armed with a list of needed improvements, projected implementation and budget proposals can be developed. Not all items and deficiencies can be corrected immediately but a roadmap for taking positive action to enhance the overall security conditions can be developed and planned for.

Program Support:

A Security and Threat Assessment is a good start at evaluating risks and vulnerabilities; however, without supporting an organization through these improvements, it has little value. As a follow up to this initial assessment, The WOCCISD Police Department is prepared to support our district in developing emergency response plans and procedures, training personnel, assisting in managing table top exercises, and providing expert training should the district decide to pursue any above listed program on our campus (es).

Threat Assessments are site specific and even though they tend to have similarities in the areas being assessed, are still very individualistic with different variables. For most organizations, having individual assessments contracted can be cost prohibitive and, must be revisited periodically for they are not sustainable for a long-term program.

Assessments have a shelf life and should be reevaluated annually at a minimum. Performing these assessments requires specific training but that does not mean a school district cannot perform their own; it just requires them to be trained.

Author: D. Hunt

One approach is to offer a Train the Trainer (T3) Program to instruct selected district employees to conduct the assessments and follow through the process to include recommendations and action plans. Training a select group to perform this task guarantees the district can, over a long period, perform this valuable function and comply with state mandates that continue to develop in this arena. This approach offers considerable cost savings to the district versus contracting services for each site. The program and training can be made available should this be seen as a viable option.

Appendix

School Door Barricades

Several styles of door barricades are available and are relatively inexpensive. Schools can direct purchase these items and install them themselves. These offer a great improvement in the denial of entry against an intruder, are easily operated, and are inexpensive.

Active Shooter Response (Electronic notification system) - ASR

Assessment Completed by:

Chief Darryl C. Hunt

dhunt@woccisd.net

West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Police Department

1400 Newton Street

Orange, Texas 77630